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INTRODUCTION 
Genomic research is at an impasse. In the decade since the 
completion of the first draft of the human genome, progress has 
been made, but few of the grandest promises of genomics have 
materialized. Biomedical researchers largely agree that one 
critical thing is essential to propel genomics into the future and 
maintain its legitimacy: more bodies. This Article will examine 
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recent efforts at massive recruitment of subjects to participate 
in biomedical research and will argue that such efforts, while 
clearly motivated by a desire to drive biomedical research to its 
next stage of promised critical breakthroughs, also promote a 
privatized conception of citizenship that configures citizens’ 
duties as serving the public good primarily through serving the 
good of private corporations—pharmaceutical manufacturers in 
particular. This reconfiguration of citizenship, in turn, 
implicates the allocation of related public resources to support 
drug development. 
This Article explores the tacit interconnections among five 
major federally sponsored biomedical initiatives of the past 
decade in order to illuminate critical aspects of the current 
drive to get bodies. The initiatives are: 1) a multi-year study 
conducted for the National Institutes of Health (NIH) by the 
Genetics and Public Policy Center (GPPC) at Johns Hopkins 
University to examine methods of effectively recruiting subjects 
to a national biobank;1 2) the passage of the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) in 2008;2 3) the 
Million Veteran Program (MVP), an initiative of the 
Department of Veterans Affairs to enroll one million veterans 
in a massive federal biobank to promote biomedical research;3 
4) the July 2011 publication by the Department of Health and 
Human Services of an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking 
(ANPRM) to reconsider the “Common Rule” regulating the 
protection of human subjects in research;4 and 5) the creation, 
in 2011, of the National Center for Advancing Translation 
Science (NCATS) at the NIH, which aims to develop 
collaborative relationships with industry to “de-risk” early 
stage drug research and bridge the “valley of death” between 
bench science and the actual production of valid therapeutic 
interventions.5 
                                                          
 1. See infra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 2. See infra notes 152–55 and accompanying text. 
 3. See infra notes 379–82 and accompanying text. 
 4. See infra note 413 and accompanying text. 
 5. Francis S. Collins, Reengineering Translational Science: The Time Is 
Right, SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED., July 6, 2011, at 5 (“Through partnerships 
that capitalize on our respective strengths, NIH, academia, philanthropy, 
patient advocates, and the private sector can take full advantage of the 
promise of translational science to deliver solutions to the millions of people 
who await new and better ways to detect, treat, and prevent disease.”); NAT’L 
CTR. FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCI., TRANSFORMING TRANSLATIONAL 
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Framing these initiatives are calls from prominent federal 
actors for citizens to participate as research subjects to serve 
the public good of improving health, as they might serve on a 
jury or in the military.6 What these arguments elide, however, 
is that where jury duty directly serves the polity, participation 
in research directly serves corporations seeking to develop new 
biomedical products and only indirectly (if at all) promotes the 
public good. As recruitment efforts privatize citizenship to 
serve corporate interests, NCATS privatizes the research 
resources of the federal government, essentially socializing the 
risk of drug discovery, to serve corporate interests7—all in the 
name of serving the “public good” of health.8 In this model, 
corporations become essential mediators of the public good. The 
model also creates a fundamental asymmetry wherein citizens 
bear duties, the government carries risk, and private 
corporations reap the commercial benefits without any 
concomitant duties or obligations.9 Indeed, by law corporations 
have only one duty—to maximize return to their investors.10 
Along with the proposed new duties of citizenship, this 
Article will also explore themes of risk and potential as they 
intersect, construct, and inform relations among these diverse 
federal initiatives. Risk, as Ulrich Beck has argued, is a key 
organizing concept of modernity.11 Risk is also a central concept 
                                                          
RESEARCH 2 (2013), available at http://www.ncats.nih.gov/files/factsheet.pdf 
(providing that NCATS is developing collaborations across different scientific 
organizations which have been traditionally distinct). 
 6. See infra notes 215–18 and accompanying text. 
 7. See infra notes 542–45 and accompanying text; see also Collins, supra 
note 5, at 2 (describing how NCATS’s “new scientific approach” will “count on 
the scientific community to conceive highly innovative ideas” and then fund 
those proposed programs through the NIH grant system). 
 8. See Collins, supra note 5, at 5 (“[L]et us embark on this new 
adventure with eyes wide open . . . fixing our vision on the possibility of 
profound benefits for humankind.”); infra notes 512–14 and accompanying 
text. 
 9. See infra notes 358–60 and accompanying text. 
 10. Cf. Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory 
of Values and Cognitive Style, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 686–717, 705 (2004) 
(providing a historical view of corporate directors’ fiduciary duties to investors 
and finding that, at least for some scholars, “[t]he traditional law and 
economics approach to the maximands issue holds simply that the 
shareholder-value-maximization rule is (1) efficient and (2) workable,” but 
noting that this viewpoint is susceptible to criticism). 
 11. ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY 19 (Mark 
Ritter trans., SAGE Publications 1992) (1986). 
794 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 15:2 
 
in biomedicine,12 informing NCATS’s approach to translational 
research and providing a foundation for the ethical and 
regulatory guidelines structuring human subject research.13 As 
political scientist Jacob Hacker has argued, risk also critically 
mediates current debates over the proper roles of public and 
private spheres in governing critical social and economic goods 
such as health care.14 This is, in part, because there are basic 
value judgments embedded in defining what counts as risk, an 
act which, as Paul Slovic notes, is “an exercise in power.”15 
Potential, particularly in the domain of biobanking and 
drug development, has been widely invoked to make demands 
upon individuals and society in diverse contexts to help realize 
the great promise of modern biomedicine.16 It is in many 
respects the flip side of risk—presenting visions of hope and 
expectation rather than concern or apprehension.17 Potential is 
                                                          
 12. Claus Møldrup & Janine Marie Morgall, Risk Society—Reconsidered 
in a Drug Context, 3 HEALTH, RISK & SOC’Y 59, 72 (2001) (“[R]isks associated 
with modern drugs are . . . capable of producing risk on an objective as well as 
on a non-objective global level.”); Bryan S. Turner, Risks, Rights and 
Regulation: An Overview, 3 HEALTH, RISK & SOC’Y 9, 9 (2001). 
 13. Jonathan Kimmelman, Valuing Risk: The Ethical Review of Clinical 
Trial Safety, 14 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 369, 369 (2004) (“The ethical 
conduct of research involving human subjects demands that risks to 
participants and society be minimized through independent review, 
monitoring, and possible revision of research proposals.”); Peter H. Van Ness, 
The Concept of Risk in Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects, 15 
BIOETHICS 364, 366 (2001) (“It is especially evident in the context of 
biomedical research involving human subjects that benefits are intended and 
harms are not.”). 
 14. Jacob S. Hacker, Privatizing Risk Without Privatizing the Welfare 
State: The Hidden Politics of Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States, 
98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 243, 246 (2004) (“[T]he emergence of risk-benefit 
mismatches should itself be seen as a process that is highly mediated by 
politics.”). See generally JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT 39–57 
(2006) [hereinafter HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT] (describing the history of 
public social insurance in the United States). 
 15. Paul Slovic, Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics, and Science: Surveying the 
Risk-Assessment Battlefield, 19 RISK ANALYSIS 689, 689 (1999); see also 
SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AND PUBLIC REASON 132–49, 156–60 (2012) 
(discussing the concept of risk as it mediates between knowledge and power 
and asserting a hybrid nature of risk assessment and risk management as 
always necessarily involving value judgments as well as technical analysis). 
 16. See, e.g., infra Part X (describing how NCATS and other federally 
sponsored initiatives seek to realize the potential of genomic medicine). 
 17. MICHAEL FORTUN, PROMISING GENOMICS: ICELAND AND DECODE 
GENETICS IN A WORLD OF SPECULATION 10 (2008) (“Genomics must be 
analyzed in terms of the promise, because promise is an ineradicable feature 
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invariably connected to successive hyperbolic claims made on 
behalf of the progress of biomedical research.18 This is perhaps 
best exemplified by the speeches made at the White House 
Ceremony announcing the completion of the first rough draft of 
the human genome in June, 2000. Here, President Clinton 
declared, “[i]n coming years, doctors increasingly will be able to 
cure diseases like Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s, diabetes and 
cancer by attacking their genetic roots.”19 Prime Minister Blair 
characterized the draft as “a breakthrough that opens the way 
for massive advances in the treatment of cancer and hereditary 
diseases, and that is only the beginning.”20 Craig Venter, then 
of Celera Genomics, attended the ceremony and was similarly 
enthused that with knowledge from the genome, we now had 
“the potential to reduce the number of cancer deaths to zero 
during our lifetimes.”21 
Promise and potential are often invoked side by side in 
such declarations, but for the purposes of this Article, I would 
like to make a distinction between the two. Here I will be 
considering promise as relating more to the commercial aspects 
of biomedicine and related therapeutic interventions, while the 
                                                          
of genomics.”); ADAM HEDGECOE, THE POLITICS OF PERSONALISED MEDICINE: 
PHARMACOGENETICS IN THE CLINIC 17 (2004) (“One of the most important 
ways in which expectations about personalized medicine are being constructed 
is through the deployment of technological visions.”); Richard Tutton, Banking 
Expectations: The Promises and Problems of Biobanks, 4 PERSONALIZED MED. 
463, 463 (2007) (“Analysts of science and technology have recently paid 
attention to how expectations, hopes and visions of the future are central to 
the dynamics of innovation in emerging technologies . . . .”). For a foundational 
essay on the anthropology of potential and its relation to risk, see Karen-Sue 
Taussig, Klaus Hoeyer & Stefan Helmreich, The Anthropology of Potentiality 
in Biomedicine: An Introduction to Supplement 7, 54 CURRENT 
ANTHROPOLOGY S3 (2013). 
 18. Tutton, supra note 17, at 467 (providing that some epidemiologists, 
disease advocacy organizations and commercial companies are 
“overwhelmingly positive” about the potential and impact of biobanks). 
 19. Remarks on the Completion of the First Survey of the Human 
Genome, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1267, 1268 (June 26, 2000). 
 20. Press Release, The White House, Remarks Made by the President, 
Prime Minister Tony Blair of England (via satellite), Dr. Francis Collins, 
Director of the National Human Genome Research Institute, and Dr. Craig 
Venter, President and Chief Scientific Officer, Celera Genomics Corporation, 
on the Completion of the First Survey of the Entire Human Genome Project 
(June 26, 2000) [hereinafter Human Genome Project Remarks] (on file with 
the National Human Genome Research Institute), available at 
http://www.genome.gov/10001356. 
 21. Id. 
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concept of potential is more often located in the objects of 
scientific study themselves—whether particular molecules or 
entire bodies. Promise generally invokes a commitment to 
provide a certain good or service to a promisee, often in return 
for a particular action or other form of support. Potential, with 
the linguistic root potentia (Latin, meaning “power, might, 
force”),22 is characterized more by a sense of latent power. In 
contrast to the commitments made by a promisor, those 
invoking potential make demands upon others in order to 
actualize its latent power. This is an admittedly crude and 
overly dichotomous characterization of the terms that in 
practice are often used interchangeably, but I find it 
heuristically useful. 
This Article will consider how tropes of risk and potential 
are deployed in efforts to reshape existing notions of public 
citizenship into emergent new understandings of citizenship as 
“privatized”—that is, as serving not only the public good but 
also private interests, particularly of drug developers, hoping to 
bring new products to market. As recruitment efforts privatize 
citizenship to serve these interests, the Article will consider 
how NCATS may be privatizing the research resources of the 
federal government, essentially socializing the risk of drug 
discovery, similarly in the name of serving the “public good” of 
health. 
On the one hand, it can be argued that promoting 
collaborative public/private research enterprises that produce 
innovative therapeutics is a clear good. On the other hand, 
where such initiatives involve the intersection of commercial 
interests with federal resources and new characterizations of 
the nature and duty of citizenship, it is imperative to consider 
some of the broader implications they might have, not only for 
biomedical innovation, but also for broader understandings of 
citizenship, risk, and the common good in a post-genomic age. 
I. GETTING BODIES 
In 1990, the U.S. government embarked on a major long-
term project to map the human genome.23 The human genome 
                                                          
 22. Latin Definition for: Potentia, Potentiae, LATDICT LATIN DICTIONARY 
& GRAMMAR RESOURCES, http://www.latin-dictionary.net/definition/31066/
potentia-potentiae (last visited Feb. 8, 2014). 
 23. Human Genome Project, NAT’L INST. HEALTH, http://report.nih.gov/
NIHfactsheets/ViewFactSheet.aspx?csid=45&key=H#H (last updated Mar. 29, 
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is comprised of some three billion base pairs of the chemical 
nucleotides: adenine, cytosine, guanine, and thymine.24 Among 
the chief aims of the Human Genome Project (HGP) were to 
determine the actual sequence of the base pairs and identify all 
the genes (portions of the genome that code for the production 
of proteins), in human DNA.25 Alternately framed as reading 
the “book of life”26 or cracking the “code of codes,”27 among 
many other grand metaphors, the HGP soon became imbued 
with great hopes and promises for improving the human 
condition.28 Dorothy Nelkin and Susan Lindee noted early on 
that DNA itself had become enveloped in a “mystique” of 
complex cultural meanings that deeply shaped broader social 
attitudes toward the HGP and related endeavors.29 
As the original plan for the first five years of the HGP 
stated: 
The information generated by the human genome project is 
expected to be the source book for biomedical science in the 21st 
century and will be of immense benefit to the field of medicine. It 
will help us to understand and eventually treat many of the more 
than 4000 genetic diseases that afflict mankind, as well as the 
many multifactorial diseases in which genetic predisposition plays 
an important role.30 
The HGP itself formally came to a close in April 2003,31 nearly 
three years after the triumphant announcement by President 
                                                          
2013) (providing key facts and a timeline related to the Human Genome 
Project). 
 24. Richard B. Hallick, Introduction to DNA Structure, U. ARIZ. (1995), 
http://www.blc.arizona.edu/molecular_graphics/dna_structure/dna_tutorial.ht
ml. 
 25. See Human Genome Project, supra note 23; The Human Genome 
Project Completion: Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. 
INST., https://www.genome.gov/11006943 (last visited Mar. 20, 2014). 
 26. See, e.g., LILY E. KAY, WHO WROTE THE BOOK OF LIFE?: A HISTORY OF 
THE GENETIC CODE 1 (Timothy Lenoir & Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht eds., 2000). 
 27. See, e.g., THE CODE OF CODES: SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE 
HUMAN GENOME PROJECT (Daniel J. Kevles & Leroy E. Hood eds., 1992). 
 28. See, e.g., Human Genome Project, supra note 23 (“[A] deeper 
understanding of genetics will shed light on more than just hereditary 
risks . . . .”). 
 29. DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE 
GENE AS A CULTURAL ICON (1995). 
 30. DEP’T OF ENERGY & NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, UNDERSTANDING OUR 
GENETIC INHERITANCE: THE U.S. HUMAN GENOME PROJECT: THE FIRST FIVE 
YEARS, FISCAL YEARS 1991–1995, at vii (1990). 
 31. A Brief Guide to Genomics, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., 
http://www.genome.gov/18016863 (last updated Oct. 19, 2011). 
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Clinton of the completion of a “working draft” of the human 
genome at a much-publicized White House Ceremony in June 
of 2001.32 
The problem was that, while a remarkable technical 
achievement, by 2003 the HGP had yet to make significant 
progress toward realizing its original great promise of finding 
new cures for disease.33 Thus, fast on the heels of the 
completion of the HGP, researchers, clinicians, and prominent 
government actors were calling for new initiatives to continue 
the march toward the promised land of genomic medicine.34 In 
2004, Francis Collins, then Director of the National Human 
Genome Research Institute (NHGRI) (later to be elevated to 
Director of the NIH under President Obama),35 reported on a 
December 2003 meeting at the NIH discussing the need for a 
massive longitudinal study of up to 200,000 people to further 
develop information needed to treat disease.36 Collins noted 
that if the experts agreed on the need for such a population 
based cohort study, “then we must collectively seek ways to 
organize and implement it quickly and efficiently—or face the 
real possibility that a decade from now the promise of genetic 
and environmental research for reducing disease burden on a 
                                                          
 32. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text. 
 33. See generally A Brief Guide to Genomics, supra note 31 (“It is 
important to realize, however, that it often takes considerable time, effort, and 
funding to move discoveries from the scientific laboratory into the medical 
clinic. Most new drugs based on genome-based research are estimated to be at 
least 10 to 15 years away.”). 
 34. Since the HGP, there has been a steady succession of new grand 
promises being made on behalf of new technologies in a march toward an ever-
receding horizon of biotechnological nirvana. See, e.g., Jonathan Kahn, 
Synthetic Hype: A Skeptical View of the Promise of Synthetic Biology, 45 VAL. 
U. L. REV. 1343, 1347 (2011) (“As the initial promises from the HGP failed to 
materialize, successive new rounds of hype followed: Stem cell therapies would 
make the blind see and the lame walk; pharmacogenomics would provide 
individualized therapies to tailor medicines directly to your personal genetic 
profile; Genome Wide Association Studies (‘GWAS’) would unravel the 
mysteries of common complex diseases such as diabetes; new initiatives, such 
as the Personal Genome Project would provide the sort of information we 
originally thought to glean from the HGP; the epigenome would provide the 
answers to how the genome really worked; and so on, and so on.”). 
 35. David Brown, Obama Picks Francis Collins as New NIH Director, 
WASH. POST (July 8, 2009, 9:41 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/07/08/AR2009070802769.html. 
 36. Francis S. Collins, The Case for a U.S. Prospective Cohort Study of 
Genes and Environment, 429 NATURE 475, 476 (2004). 
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population basis will remain out of reach.”37 Collins was 
arguing that to truly realize the promise of genetic research, 
what was really needed was bodies, lots of bodies, at least 
200,000 bodies for the one study he was discussing in this 
paper.38 Bodies were so important that failure to get them 
could place the entire genomic enterprise, begun by the HGP, 
at risk.39 
Here, at the outset, Collins placed a certain type of risk at 
the center of his call for genomic innovation: a risk of lost 
potential and lost hopes.40 Collins also bound together 
recruitment, risk, and potential in a manner that placed the 
obligation for realizing continued progress on forces outside of 
the scientific enterprise of genomics itself, into the social and 
political world where responsibility for the logistics of realizing 
such a large-scale population cohort study would inevitably 
fall.41 
Two years later, when further making the case for large-
scale prospective cohort studies, Collins and others asserted 
that: 
The sequencing of the human genome and increased 
investigation of its function are providing powerful research tools 
for identifying genetic variants that contribute to common 
diseases. Recognition is growing, however, that genetic variants 
alone cannot account for most cases of chronic disease. It is far 
more likely that environmental and behavioural changes, in 
interaction with a genetic predisposition, have produced most of 
the recent increases in chronic disease, and might therefore be the 
key to reversing this trend.42 
The HGP was all well and good, but it was conducted primarily 
in laboratories and involved deriving the complete sequence for 
only one prototypical genome.43 Identifying genes alone, it 
                                                          
 37. Id. at 477. 
 38. Id. at 476 (“These shortcomings could be addressed by a longitudinal 
study of 200,000 people.”). 
 39. Id. at 477. 
 40. Id. at 476 (“[T]he probable presence of different environmental risk 
factors, and the potential for limited access to data and biological materials 
make it unlikely that the current cohort projects will be adequate for the 
needs of the United States.”). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Teri A. Manolio et al., Genes, Environment and the Value of 
Prospective Cohort Studies, 7 NATURE 812, 812 (2006) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 43. See Human Genome Project, supra note 23. 
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turned out, did not carry us very far down the road toward the 
promised land of genomic medicine.44 The thinking now was 
that to fully understand the complexity of the gene-
environment interactions that contributed to most common 
diseases, scientists would need to study large numbers of 
genomes in context in order to pick up the many small effects 
that cumulatively might play a significant role in determining 
health outcomes.45 
Getting bodies is complicated. There are already multiple 
population cohort studies that have been ongoing in the United 
States for many years.46 Prominent among these are the 
Framingham Heart Study47 and the Jackson Heart Study.48 
The Framingham Study originally recruited 5209 white men 
and women between the ages of thirty and sixty-two from the 
town of Framingham, Massachusetts, and tracked them for 
decades to study common patterns related to the development 
of cardiovascular disease.49 The study enrolled new generations 
of participants in 1971 and again in 2002.50 The Jackson Study 
began in 1999 and recruited 5301 African Americans in and 
around Jackson, Mississippi.51 It focuses on identifying factors 
that contribute to the much higher incidence of cardiovascular 
disease in African American populations.52 These significant 
studies have produced valuable information but operate at a 
much smaller scale than that contemplated earlier by Collins.53 
Indeed, later in 2004, an NIH panel of experts recommended 
that a population of 500,000 would be optimal for the sort of 
                                                          
 44. See Kahn, supra note 34, at 1346–53. 
 45. Manolio et al., supra note 42, at 813 (summarizing the advantages of 
cohort studies that can better identify genetic risk factors and markers). 
 46. Id. 
 47. FRAMINGHAM HEART STUDY, http://www.framinghamheartstudy.org 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2014). 
 48. JACKSON HEART STUDY, https://www.jacksonheartstudy.org/jhsinfo 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2014). 
 49. History of the Framingham Heart Study, FRAMINGHAM HEART STUDY, 
http://www.framinghamheartstudy.org/about/history.html (last visited Feb. 8, 
2014). 
 50. Id. 
 51. For Researchers, JACKSON HEART STUDY, https://
www.jacksonheartstudy.org/jhsinfo/Researchers/tabid/122/Default.aspx (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2014). 
 52. JACKSON HEART STUDY, supra note 48. 
 53. Collins envisioned a “longitudinal study of 200,000 people.” Collins, 
supra note 36, at 477. 
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large-scale prospective study discussed by Collins.54 This 
marked an entirely different scale of research. In ambition it is 
more akin to one of the national DNA biobanks being developed 
by such countries as Britain, Japan, and Estonia, among 
others.55 Accordingly, the NHGRI’s plans for a prospective 
large population study (LPS) demanded extensive 
consideration of both the logistics and ethics of recruitment.56 
Such considerations clearly animated the NHGRI’s 
decision in 2006 to award $2 million to the Genetics and Public 
Policy Center (GPPC) at Johns Hopkins University to engage 
in a two-year cooperative Public Consultation Project (PCP) on 
public attitudes toward participating in a possible large-cohort 
study of genetic and environmental contributors to health.57 
Dubbed, “Making Every Voice Count: Public Consultation on 
Genetics, Environment, and Health,” the project came to 
                                                          
 54. NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST., NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, 
DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS FOR A POTENTIAL UNITED STATES POPULATION-
BASED COHORT TO DETERMINE THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG GENES, 
ENVIRONMENT, AND HEALTH: RECOMMENDATIONS OF AN EXPERT PANEL 6–7 
(2005) [hereinafter COHORT REPORT], available at http://www.genome.gov/
Pages/About/OD/ReportsPublications/PotentialUSCohort.pdf (explaining that 
the panel also looked at sample sizes as large as 1,000,000 participants); see 
Manolio et al., supra note 42, at 818. 
 55. Richard Tutton, Constructing Participation in Genetic Databases: 
Citizenship, Governance and Ambivalence, 32 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 172, 
172 (2007). A report from a public meeting of the U.K. Biobank Ethics and 
Governance Council provides a useful, succinct description of a biobank:  
Originally, and often still now, the term “biobanks” refers to 
collections of biospecimens which are available for some dispersive 
use (as compared with archival reference use). More recently the term 
has come to include collections of biospecimens along with related 
health and/or social information to be used in research. Often these 
biobanks are accumulated in the course of clinical care, and are often 
closely held by those who created the collection. The most robust 
contemporary definition of ‘biobanks’ is “rich collections of data plus 
biospecimens, specifically developed as resources for research”.  
UK BIOBANK ETHICS & GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, REPORT: PUBLIC MEETING OF 
THE UK BIOBANK ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE COUNCIL 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.egcukbiobank.org.uk/stellent/groups/egc/@msh_grants/documents/
web_document/wtx041249.pdf. 
 56. COHORT REPORT, supra note 54, at 5 (providing that surveys and focus 
groups could help to obtain input on recruitment approaches which then will 
define expectations about the consent process and privacy protections). 
 57. Making Every Voice Count: Public Consultation on Genetics, 
Environment, and Health, JOHNS HOPKINS U. GENETICS & PUB. POL’Y 
CENTER, http://www.dnapolicy.org/policy.consult.gene.php (last visited Feb. 8, 
2014). 
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involve focus groups, community leader interviews, and town 
halls in five U.S. cities, as well as a 4000-person national 
survey.58 It also developed educational materials to provide 
background information for the various targets of 
engagement.59 In the years that followed, the GPPC, under the 
direction of Kathy Hudson,60 came to play a central role in 
furthering the federal government’s efforts to get bodies for an 
LPS. 
Increasing pressure to enroll participants throughout 
biomedical research has brought into being what sociologist 
Steven Epstein has characterized as “a new science . . . that 
might be called ‘recruitmentology.’”61 While applicable to a 
broad array of recruitment practices and actors for diverse 
projects (ranging from small observational studies at academic 
health centers to large multinational clinical trials for drug 
development), Epstein notes that “[p]ractitioners of 
recruitmentology seek to produce and disseminate knowledge 
about how to successfully recruit and retain participants.”62 In 
contrast to the science of clinical trials, which evaluates the 
efficacy of therapies, Epstein posits that the “science of 
recruitmentology evaluates the efficacy of techniques necessary 
to get bodies into a trial in the first place, and to keep them 
there throughout the life of the experiment.”63 The GPPC 
efforts on behalf of the NHGRI in laying the groundwork for an 
LPS fall squarely under the rubric of recruitmentology. Indeed, 
for the GPPC, identifying “the best recruitment strategies” was 
a central concern of its PCP.64 
The NHGRI came to the GPPC because, prior to 
undertaking an initiative as massive as a 500,000-person LPS, 
it understandably wanted to gauge public attitudes about and 
                                                          
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. GPPC at Five, GENETICS & PUB. POL’Y CENTER (Apr. 18, 2007), 
http://www.dnapolicy.org/news.enews.article.nocategory.php?action=detail&ne
wsletter_id=21&article_id=81 (reflecting on Kathy Hudson’s work at the 
GPPC). 
 61. Steven Epstein, The Rise of “Recruitmentology”: Clinical Research, 
Racial Knowledge, and the Politics of Inclusion and Difference, 38 SOC. STUD. 
SCI. 801, 802 (2008). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 803. 
 64. Making Every Voice Count: Public Consultation on Genetics, 
Environment, and Health, supra note 57. 
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willingness to participate in such a project.65 The PCP involved 
focus groups and “town halls” conducted in diverse locations 
across the country.66 At sixteen focus groups in six cities, GPPC 
representatives showed participants a video explaining the 
proposed LPS, and then discussed whether the study should be 
done and what factors would influence their willingness to 
participate.67 Following the focus groups, the GPPC conducted 
twenty-seven individual interviews about the proposed study 
with community leaders in the same locations.68 The GPPC 
used the information derived from the focus groups and 
interviews to shape the subsequent town hall meetings and the 
design of a national survey.69 
The GPPC held five town hall meetings in 2008 in Jackson, 
Mississippi; Kansas City, Missouri; Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania; Phoenix, Arizona; and Portland, Oregon (the 
same cities where it conducted the focus groups).70 The 
meetings had audiences ranging from 76 to 134 people.71 The 
GPPC made efforts to have the participants roughly match the 
demographics of their local communities.72 Each meeting began 
with a presentation by a “senior member” of the GPPC staff, 
who welcomed the participants and explained that the PCP 
was hoping to “gather feedback on a proposed large-cohort 
government study of genes, environment, and health.”73 The 
proceedings were then turned over to be moderated by 
Jonathan Ortmans, of the Public Forum Institute, which 
describes itself as “an independent, nonpartisan, not-for-profit 
organization committed to developing the most advanced and 
effective means of fostering public discourse.”74 
                                                          
 65. SHAWNA WILLIAMS ET AL., JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. GENETICS & PUB. 
POLICY CTR., THE GENETIC TOWN HALL: PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT RESEARCH 
ON GENES, ENVIRONMENT, AND HEALTH 3, 5 (2009), available at 
http://www.dnapolicy.org/images/reportpdfs/2009PCPTownHalls.pdf. 
 66. Id. at 3. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 4. 
 74. About, PUB. FORUM INST., http://publicforuminstitute.org/about/ (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2014). 
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The moderator framed the event with the following three 
sets of questions: 
1. Do you think the government should create a national biobank? 
Why or why not? 
2. Would you participate in such a biobank? Why or why not? 
3. What conditions need to be in place in order for the biobank to 
happen?75 
Participants were then shown a nine-minute video discussing 
genetic variation and its possible contribution to disease.76 The 
video also described how the project planned to collect genetic 
samples and data about medical history, diet, lifestyle, and 
environmental exposures from up to 500,000 U.S. residents.77 
It informed viewers that researchers, both public and private 
would have access to this information to study how genes, 
environment, and lifestyle contribute to disease.78 During the 
course of the video, a female narrator states: 
No program large enough to do this has ever been done in the 
United States. But other countries have begun studying gene-
environment interactions. Many people in these counties have 
given their permission to researchers to take genetic samples. . . . 
including Great Britain, Iceland, Estonia, Japan, and Canada. 
Here in the United States, the National Institutes of Health and 
other federal health agencies have a similar project in mind but it 
has not yet been approved or funded. NIH would like to get a lot of 
public input before going ahead to make sure U.S. citizens are 
comfortable with the project, have a say in how it’s run and are 
willing to participate in it.79 
There are a few noteworthy aspects to this particular framing. 
First, in referring to existing programs in other countries, the 
video clearly gives the impression that this is an increasingly 
common practice, implying that as others have given 
permission, so too would it be reasonable for these participants 
to give their permission. Second, in the reference to other 
national projects, as opposed to private ones (for example, 
projects being developed at the Mayo Clinic80 or Vanderbilt 
                                                          
 75. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 65, at 4. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 5. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Video: The Proposed Study, at 2:44–3:43 (Johns Hopkins Univ. 
Genetics & Pub. Policy Ctr. 2008) [hereinafter The Proposed Study], available 
at http://www.dnapolicy.org/video/tps/index.htm. 
 80. Mayo Clinic Biobank Overview, MAYO CLINIC, http://
mayoresearch.mayo.edu/mayo/research/biobank (last visited Feb. 9, 2014). 
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University),81 there is also perhaps an implicit call to 
patriotism (at best) or (less positively) to a jingoistic concern 
about the United States being left behind in the march of 
biomedical progress. Third, the stated concerns to make sure 
citizens are “comfortable, . . . have a say . . . and are willing to 
participate,”82 while reasonable, may also be problematic. 
Comfort and having a say are well and good but they seem 
clearly geared toward actualizing the third concern (i.e., 
insuring a willingness to participate). 
The focus groups and town halls certainly allow for a 
measure of citizen feedback that could shape how the project is 
carried out. Having a say implies a measure of power, but the 
town halls do not appear to have provided any ongoing 
mechanism for citizens to exercise any substantive control over 
how the project would be carried out.83 They “have a say” in the 
recruitment process but not in the substance of the project 
itself.84 Thus, “having a say” appears to be part of the 
preliminary process of making potential subjects “comfortable” 
so that they will be more willing to participate.85 This fits 
squarely within a “sub-genre” of recruitmentology identified by 
Epstein as seeking “to determine the barriers that keep 
individuals from volunteering.”86 
NHGRI Director Francis Collins also makes an appearance 
in the video to declare that a big study of hundreds of 
thousands will “really give us answers” and serve as “a 
discovery engine for everything we need to know about 
medicine in the future.”87 Collins’s enthusiasm is 
understandable. In many respects he was simply following up 
                                                          
 81. D.M. Roden et al., Development of a Large-Scale De-identified DNA 
Biobank to Enable Personalized Medicine, 84 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & 
THERAPEUTICS 362, 362 (2008). 
 82. The Proposed Study, supra note 79, at 3:37–3:42. 
 83. Cf. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 65, at 4, 7 (discussing the town hall 
meeting process, which focused primarily on determining whether 
participants thought the study should move forward and whether the 
participants themselves would be willing to participate). 
 84. Cf. id. at 7 (providing that the town halls included some discussion of 
study benefits and burdens, as well as acceptable and unacceptable types of 
research). 
 85. Cf. id. (describing how the researchers sought to uncover what factors 
or assurances would make individuals more likely to participate in the 
project). 
 86. Epstein, supra note 61, at 810–11. 
 87. The Proposed Study, supra note 79, at 3:45–4:58. 
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on the statements made at the White House ceremony 
announcing the completion of the first draft of the human 
genome.88 One problem, perhaps, is that those earlier 
statements were made at the turn of the millennium, and here, 
eight years later, Collins was still looking to the future and 
calling for another new venture to keep us on the path toward 
the ever-receding horizon of biomedical promise.89  
Collins’s remarks also differ from the earlier 
pronouncements in two distinct ways. First, Collins’s 
statements are made to propel forward a nascent project rather 
than celebrate the fruition of an existing one.90 Second, they 
are directed at potential research subjects.91 Such remarks 
function very differently in the context of recruitment. The 
difference may be understood, in part, by considering the 
relation between invoking the “promise” of genomics and 
invoking its “potential.”92 In his exemplary ethnography of the 
ventures of deCODE Genetics in Iceland and the related 
creation of Iceland’s biobank (alluded to in the PCP 
presentation), Mike Fortun notes that “[t]he language of 
promising is a diverse and intricate one, demanding equally 
diverse and intricate analyses.”93 While my consideration of 
promise here is far more modest than that undertaken by 
Fortun, I agree with him that “promising is an ineradicable 
feature of genomics.”94 This is so largely because the complexity 
                                                          
 88. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text. 
 89. The Proposed Study, supra note 79, at 3:45–4:58; cf. Kahn, supra note 
34, at 1346 (describing the “ever receding horizon of promise”). 
 90. The Proposed Study, supra note 79, at 3:45–4:58. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See, e.g., FORTUN, supra note 17, at 102–13 (highlighting the ways 
“promising manifests itself in genomics”); HEDGECOE, supra note 17, at 16–17 
(“In these terms, we can see pharmacogenetics . . . as a ‘promissory science’, a 
discipline that exists more in the speculations and promises of its supporters 
than in terms of scientific results and marketable products.”); Michael 
Arribas-Ayllon et al., Promissory Accounts of Personalisation in the 
Commercialisation of Genomic Knowledge, 8 COMM. & MED. 53, 53 (2011) 
(noting that in the context of direct to consumer genetic test marketing, 
“promising information that will empower prevention of common complex 
diseases and ensure better quality of life is conflated with promising greater 
access to personal information”). On the concept of potential in the life 
sciences, see generally Taussig, Hoeyer & Helmreich, supra note 17, at S3–
S12 (suggesting that “anthropologists of the life sciences” should utilize and 
work “with the concept of potentiality”). 
 93. FORTUN, supra note 17, at 9. 
 94. Id. at 10. 
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of contemporary genomics, involving whole genome scans of 
large populations and examinations of the complex interactions 
of genes, behavior, and environment, is full of uncertainty and 
contingencies so that results can only be promised, not directly 
forecast.95 Making such promises, as Fortun notes, “speaking 
very roughly, entails a mixture of a high degree of speculation, 
an avowed commitment stemming from multiple insecure 
extrapolations, and bets or gambles placed with a combination 
of care and risk.”96 
Promises can be influential and do a lot of work in 
enlisting resources and propelling an enterprise forward. 
Clinton, Blair, and Venter were largely celebrating the 
“promise” of genomics in marking the completion of the first 
draft of the human genome.97 Generally speaking, once made, a 
promise does not further call upon the promisee to be realized. 
Promise and potential may often be mixed—“if you fund us, we 
will have the potential to cure cancer!”—but when they are, the 
promise takes on different valences.98 Potential, with its 
connotations of latent power, may require ongoing action from 
the promisee to be realized.99 It therefore may make different 
sorts of demands than a simple promise. Genomic promises are 
often really about potential—about unlocking the latent power 
of information stored in the genome to enable us to cure 
disease.100 In the context of developing an LPS, diverse actors 
invoke this potential to make demands on fellow citizens—in 
particular, to demand their participation in research to cure 
disease.101 In this context, a decision not to participate is not 
                                                          
 95. See id. at 10–11 (discussing the necessity of analyzing genomics “in 
the terms of the promise” on account of the complexity and uncertainty 
involved). 
 96. Id. at 10. 
 97. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text. 
 98. See, e.g., Tutton, supra note 17, at 467 (discussing the potential of 
biobanks to improve clinical practice and whether “investment in biobanks 
will yield the promised results”). 
 99. See, e.g., FORTUN, supra note 17, at 10–11 (arguing that genomic 
corporations are essentially providing promises “to produce future products” 
designed to live up to the potential of genomics). 
 100. See, e.g., Human Genome Project Remarks, supra note 20 
(highlighting the “remarkable promise of biomedical research” to cure 
disease). 
 101. See, e.g., Making Every Voice Count: Public Consultation on Genetics, 
Environment, and Health, supra note 57 (explaining the necessity of citizen 
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simply turning down a proposed bargain as in a promissory 
contract (“if you give me this, I promise to give you that”); it is 
thwarting scientific progress itself (“if you do not participate, 
we cannot realize the potential of genomics to cure disease”). 
This, I believe, is evident in the PCP presentation and related 
endeavors to recruit subjects into a massive new federally 
sponsored LPS and related enterprises. 
Returning to Collins’s statement to potential subjects in 
the PCP video, it presents the idea that participating in an LPS 
will provide researchers with “a discovery engine for everything 
we need to know about medicines in the future.”102 This is not a 
general declaration about the importance of some abstract LPS; 
it is part of a specific appeal to recruit subjects to participate. It 
is telling them that their bodies are needed to realize this 
vision. In a similar vein, the GPPC’s flyer describing the PCP 
opens with the bolded question to the prospective participant: 
“Would you volunteer to help solve medical mysteries?”103 By 
framing the project as a call to actively “help” it becomes clear 
that this is not just about promising future medical advances; 
it is making a claim upon individuals to participate, with the 
unstated message being that failure to do so places the 
realization of the biomedical potential of the LPS at risk.104 
“Are you,” the flyer continues, “and a half-million of your 
fellow citizens ready and willing to volunteer . . . ? That 
question, as well as what incentives would encourage study 
participation and what concerns people might have, is at the 
heart of the Genetics & Public Policy Center’s Public 
Consultation Project.”105 The invocation of citizenship is 
particularly striking, connoting, as it does, conceptions of duty 
                                                          
participation in order to obtain the research necessary to understand and fight 
complex diseases). 
 102. The Proposed Study, supra note 79, at 4:45–4:58. 
 103. Public Consultation Project on Genes, Environment, and Your Health, 
JOHNS HOPKINS U. GENETICS & PUB. POL’Y CENTER, http://www.dnapolicy.org/
resources/PCPdescription.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2014) [hereinafter GPPC 
Flyer]; cf. Making Every Voice Count: Public Consultation on Genetics, 
Environment, and Health, supra note 57 (“This project will help determine 
what Americans think . . . .”). 
 104. See GPPC Flyer, supra note 103; Making Every Voice Count: Public 
Consultation on Genetics, Environment, and Health, supra note 57 (stating 
that without the “participation of hundreds of thousands of volunteers,” the 
“research necessary to understand” the complexities of genetic diseases would 
not be possible). 
 105. GPPC Flyer, supra note 103. 
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and service to a public good.106 The GPPC is quite clear, 
however, that it is also looking for “incentives” to encourage 
participation, indicating an understanding that a sort of quid 
pro quo might provide a useful complement to claims of civic 
duty.107 More fundamentally, this and other statements about 
the PCP indicate a tension within its framing and goals. 
The GPPC characterized the PCP as an exercise in 
“deliberative democracy.”108 The concept of “deliberative 
democracy” has been the subject of extensive study and 
discussion and may not be readily susceptible to one set 
definition.109 But if democracy of any sort involves popular 
power and control, the PCP conferred little of this upon 
participants. The focus groups, town halls, and survey were 
less about seeking public input in order to determine whether a 
federally sponsored LPS should go forward, to what ends it 
might be directed, or how it might be pursued, than it was 
about gathering input on how best to frame a pitch to potential 
subjects in order more effectively to recruit them into 
participating in the project.110 The moderator followed a set 
script that imposed a clear structure for discussion upon the 
participants.111 The preset agenda specified limited periods of 
discussion on prechosen topics—including “Initial Impressions” 
                                                          
 106. See id. (“Are you and a half-million of your fellow citizens ready and 
willing to volunteer . . . to try to advance our understanding of how genes and 
environment contribute to disease?”). 
 107. See id. (“[The question of] what incentives would encourage study 
participation . . . is at the heart of the [GPPC’s] Public Consultation Project.”). 
 108. Public Consultation and Engagement, JOHNS HOPKINS U. GENETICS & 
PUB. POL’Y CENTER, http://www.dnapolicy.org/policy.consult.php (last visited 
Jan. 25, 2014). 
 109. See, e.g., Jon Elster, Introduction to DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 8–9 
(Jon Elster ed., 1998) (providing various definitions of deliberative democracy 
used by contributors to the book that “differ widely from one another”); JAMES 
S. FISHKIN, WHEN THE PEOPLE SPEAK: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND 
PUBLIC CONSULTATION 80 (2009) (conceptualizing deliberative democracy as a 
democratic theory which “attempts to combine deliberation by the people 
themselves with political equality”); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS F. THOMPSON, 
WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 7 (2004) (defining deliberative democracy as 
“a form of government in which free and equal citizens . . . justify decisions in 
a process in which they give one another reasons that are mutually acceptable 
and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching conclusions that are binding 
in the present . . . but open to challenge in the future”). 
 110. See supra text accompanying notes 83–86. 
 111. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 65, at 4, 7 (describing the process and 
agenda for the town hall meetings). 
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(fifteen minutes); “Benefits and Burdens” (thirty minutes); 
“Acceptable and Unacceptable Types of Research” (ten 
minutes); and “Return of Results” (ten minutes).112 One of the 
final sections was titled “Build your own Contract,” a twenty-
minute period during which participants were to list “elements 
that should be included in research agreements between the 
researchers and study participants for the proposed study.”113 
In this context, “deliberation” was not directed to coming to 
an informed, mutually agreed-upon course of action that 
empowers participants; it was being used as a tool to elicit 
information from subjects about what “incentives” might 
encourage them to participate in an LPS, which in turn would 
then be used to elicit even greater amounts of (genetic) 
information from them (or other prospective participants in an 
LPS).114 The structuring frame of such discussions was not 
“should we do this?” or “how should we do this?”, but “what do 
we need to do to get you to participate?” These questions, of 
course, are not mutually exclusive, but the process did not 
foster any questioning of the underlying enterprise, serving 
merely as a consideration of how to make recruitment to it 
more effective. It was, as terms such as “focus group” might 
indicate, more an exercise in marketing than democracy. 
Such an approach is not unique to the GPPC’s and 
NHGRI’s plans for large cohort genomic studies. In his study of 
similar focus groups conducted as part of the UK Biobank 
Project, Richard Tutton discusses what he terms the “discourse 
of participation” in such projects, which he suggests “can be 
seen as a[n] . . . institutional response to public ambivalence 
toward science and expertise.”115 The idea of seeking 
“participants” in research, Tutton observes, is a distinctly 
recent phenomenon.116 In the past, subjects were viewed as 
passive or expendable.117 Following the aftermath of the 
atrocities of World War II, and with the rise of modern 
bioethics, subjects became vulnerable and in need of ethical 
                                                          
 112. Id. at 7. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See supra notes 83–86, 110 and accompanying text. 
 115. Richard Tutton, Constructing Participation in Genetic Databases: 
Citizenship, Governance, and Ambivalence, 32 SCI. TECH. HUM. VALUES 172, 
172 (2007). 
 116. Id. at 175. 
 117. Id. 
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protection.118 In the context of biobank recruitment, subjects 
are increasingly being cast as “empowered citizens”—
empowered largely with information that enables them to 
make free, informed, and rational decisions.119 Tutton argues, 
however, that in practice, the “discourse of participation is used 
by the institutions behind UK Biobank” to enact a constrained 
and impoverished model of participation that is “largely 
confined to providing samples and data to the project, with the 
likelihood of receiving some general feedback about the 
progress and key findings of the research in the future.”120 
Nonetheless, alternative approaches have also been tried. 
Researchers in Canada devoted considerable attention to 
developing models of deliberative democracy for engaging the 
public around the creation of the “BC Biolibrary,” which “was 
established in 2007 to support biobanking and a broad range of 
health research applications that utilize biospecimens in 
British Columbia, Canada.”121 In contrast to the GPPC’s town 
halls, which conceived of public engagement primarily as a 
means to overcome barriers to recruitment, researchers at the 
W. Maurice Young Centre for Applied Ethics, University of 
British Columbia, clearly stated: 
When talking about public engagement, we are not referring to 
unidirectional attempts to increase public awareness of certain 
aspects of science and technology; nor are we referring to the 
measurement of ‘public opinion’ on certain controversial issues. 
Rather, we are concerned with mechanisms whereby there can be 
meaningful and legitimate public input into policy that involves 
dialogue between relevant publics with scientists, policy makers, 
and other stakeholders.122 
To act on this vision, the BC Biolibrary project took a very 
different approach to public engagement. It opted for one single 
group of twenty-five Canadians, chosen to represent “the 
                                                          
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. (respecting participation in biomedical research). 
 120. Id. at 188. 
 121. Kieran O’Doherty & Alice Hawkins, Structuring Public Engagement 
for Effective Input in Policy Development on Human Tissue Biobanking, 13 
PUB. HEALTH GENOMICS 197, 200 (2010). 
 122. Id. at 198–99 (providing that similar efforts have also been 
undertaken by the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota); see also K.C. 
O’Doherty & M.M. Burgess, Engaging the Public on Biobanks: Outcomes of the 
BC Biobank Deliberation, 12 PUB. HEALTH GENOMICS 203, 205 (2009) 
(explaining the use of deliberative democracy to foster public engagement in 
the BC Biolibrary project). 
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diversity of values, life experiences, and discursive styles of the 
citizens of British Columbia,” and selected also to give “voice to 
individuals and groups that would otherwise not be heard.”123 
In contrast to the PCP’s nine minute introductory video, BC 
Biolibary prepared a workbook for participants outlining key 
areas of ethical concern, including: collection of biospecimens; 
initial contact/introducing the biobank to potential donors; 
linking samples to personal information; consent; and 
governance of biospecimens and associated data.124 In perhaps 
the most significant difference from the PCP, participants met 
over the course of four days (instead of the PCP’s three hours) 
to discuss the issues in depth.125 Discussion facilitators “gave 
particular attention to ensuring that all voices were heard and 
no views glossed over in the formulation of final 
recommendations.”126 
This last concern with respect to participants’ voices, while 
seemingly self-evident, gains salience in light of the 
observations made by anthropologist Karen-Sue Taussig while 
at one of the actual GPPC town hall events.127 Taussig speaks 
of being haunted by the interactions between a participant and 
the moderator at a town hall in Portland, Oregon.128 The 
exchange began following the showing of an introductory video 
when the participant, whom Taussig calls “Sally,” asked, “If we 
participate in this study and you find out we have the breast 
cancer gene, are you going to tell us?”129 The moderator evaded 
the question because it did not fit in with the preset agenda, 
saying: “[T]hat is a really good question and it is one we are 
going to come to later. Right now we’d like to hear, based on 
what you know, do you think the study should be done?”130 
About twenty minutes later the moderator turned to the 
question of return of results, but asked the participants to 
discuss what kind of research they think people should be able 
                                                          
 123. O’Doherty & Hawkins, supra note 121, at 201. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 201–02. 
 126. Id. at 202. 
 127. Karen-Sue Taussig, Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological 
Association, Fantasies of Human Perfectability: Conceptualizing Potentiality 
and the Molecular Medical Toolkit (Nov. 22, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author). 
 128. Id. at 6–15. 
 129. Id. at 10. 
 130. Id. at 11. 
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to do, or not do, with materials in a biobank.131 Participants 
began generating a list and Sally, whose hand has been raised, 
said: “[S]o, if you have the breast cancer gene are they going to 
tell you or not?”132 The moderator responded, saying, “I’ll come 
to that in a minute,” and continued to call on people to add to 
the list he was generating.133 More discussion ensued, and a 
while later Sally once again raised her hand and asked: 
“[C]ouldn’t you pay a little extra to get your results?”134 Taussig 
notes that at that point “the moderator turns to look at us with 
an expression that we read as meaning something like ‘can you 
believe she’s asking about this again?’ The response is laughter 
from most of the rest of the audience. Nevertheless, the 
moderator does generate some discussion about the issue of 
getting results back.”135 At the end of the discussion, the 
moderator asked the participants to vote yes or no about 
whether researchers should try to return relevant information 
to biobank participants.136 Taussig relates that at that point, 
she looked over to Sally’s table and saw that she was gone.137 
The story is haunting, in part, because it seems to conflict 
so starkly with the GPPC’s avowed purpose of “making every 
voice count” in the public consultation process.138 It also 
highlights the degree to which the process was not structured 
as a true dialogue, but as a means to elicit information from the 
participants.139 This brings us back to Tutton’s observation 
that discourses of participation and consultation may primarily 
be serving the ends of recruitment rather than 
empowerment.140 Such engagement as that provided by the 
PCP, however, is only a first step toward recruitment. Indeed, 
one of the primary goals of the consultation was to identify 
concerns and fears that might be acting as barriers to 
                                                          
 131. Id. at 12. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 14. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 14–15. 
 137. Id. at 15. 
 138. E.g., Making Every Voice Count: Public Consultation on Genetics, 
Environment, and Health, supra note 57. 
 139. See supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text. 
 140. See supra notes 119–20 and accompanying text. 
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participation.141 As it turned out, foremost among these were 
concerns over loss of privacy and the related “possibility that 
insurance companies might obtain individuals’ genetic 
information and use it against them.”142 Many participants also 
expressed a strong desire for research results; that is, to have 
relevant information discovered from their samples returned to 
them.143 GPPC researchers found this particularly noteworthy 
in light of the fact that they had the moderator explain to the 
participants “that individual research results are usually not 
returned to study participants because of logistical burdens.”144 
That the moderator provided no similar intervention 
regarding the burdens of protecting privacy seems to indicate 
an implicit understanding on the part of those framing the 
discussion (i.e., the GPPC) that concerns over privacy were 
somehow more legitimate and addressable than those involving 
return of research results (ROR).145 Indeed, with respect to 
privacy concerns, the introductory video made clear that 
participants’ information would be “coded to hide their 
identities,” but made no mention of ROR or other concerns, 
such as commercialization of research results.146 The parallel 
GPPC online survey of 4659 people similarly found strong 
interest in ROR and observed, “[p]roviding individual research 
results is a strong motivation to participate; compensating 
participants $200 may increase participation a similar amount. 
Incentives, recruitment, and return of results could be tailored 
to demographics groups’ interests.”147 In analyzing the costs 
and benefits of such measures, the survey concluded “that 
providing even limited individual research results or graduated 
incentives over time could increase retention and 
recruitment.”148 
Notably, ROR may impose substantive burdens and 
responsibilities on researchers involving the actual content of 
                                                          
 141. Making Every Voice Count: Public Consultation on Genetics, 
Environment, and Health, supra note 57. 
 142. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 65, at 8. 
 143. Id. at 9–10. 
 144. Id. at 9. 
 145. See id. at 14 (“Town hall participants consistently placed 
privacy . . . among their top concerns about the proposed study.”). 
 146. Id. at 5. 
 147. David Kaufman et al., Subjects Matter: A Survey of Public Opinions 
About a Large Genetic Cohort Study, 10 GENETICS MED. 831, 831 (2008). 
 148. Id. at 838. 
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the information they are deriving from the samples.149 By 
contrast, protecting privacy primarily imposes procedural 
burdens concerning management of and access to 
information.150 These are real burdens, but they do not 
materially implicate the way research itself is conducted. That 
is, ROR involves concerns about what researchers themselves 
are doing with the data, whereas privacy concerns primarily 
involve insuring that other people (e.g., non-researchers) do not 
have access to the data.151 Perhaps more to the point, concerns 
over privacy were soon to be addressed by legislation that 
imposed little burden on researchers but promised to greatly 
alleviate concerns over privacy as a potential barrier to 
recruitment. 
II. GINA: LAW AS AN ADJUNCT TO RECRUITMENT 
The 2008 GPPC report on the town halls highlighted the 
passage of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 
2008 (GINA) in May of that year.152 The law has two major 
components: Title I, which prohibits group and individual 
health insurers from using a person’s genetic information in 
determining eligibility or premiums and from requesting or 
requiring that a person undergo a genetic test;153 and Title II, 
which prohibits employers from using a person’s genetic 
information in making employment decisions, such as hiring, 
firing, job assignments, or any other terms of employment, and 
from requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic information 
about persons or their family members.154 GINA does not cover 
                                                          
 149. See, e.g., WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 65, at 9 (stating the logistical 
burdens placed on researchers regarding the return of research results). 
 150. See, e.g., id. at 12, 14 (providing the obligation of researchers to 
protect a participant’s privacy and against the misuse of information). 
 151. Cf. id. at 14 (discussing participant concerns that law enforcement 
agencies, pharmaceutical companies, or insurance companies might obtain 
and exploit individuals’ data). 
 152. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 
U.S.C.); WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 65, at 14 (providing a brief summary of 
GINA). 
 153. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, tit. 1; S. REP. NO. 110-48, 
at 2–3 (2007). 
 154. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, tit. 2; S. REP. NO. 110-48, 
at 4–5. 
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life, disability, long-term care insurance, or veterans seeking 
“health care through the Department of Veterans Affairs.”155 
GINA had its roots in legislation introduced thirteen years 
earlier by Representative Louise Slaughter that garnered 
bipartisan support but did not pass.156 Similar legislation was 
introduced during subsequent congressional sessions as the 
HGP moved toward its completion in 2003.157 Between 1996 
and 2002 the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, 
and Pensions held five hearings on genetic discrimination, but 
no progress was made toward enacting specific legislation.158 In 
2003, just as the HGP was coming to a close, Representative 
Slaughter and Senator Olympia Snowe introduced the first 
bills with the title “Genetic Information Non-Discrimination 
Act.”159 Their efforts continued during subsequent congresses, 
but it would take five more years to achieve final passage.160 
While always animated by concerns to insure that 
advances in genetic technologies could be pursued productively 
without being used to discriminate unfairly against individuals 
on the basis of their genetic makeup, the need for GINA took on 
new valences as it moved toward ultimate passage in 2008. 
Roughly coincident with the rising interest in developing a 
federally sponsored LPS and the GPPC’s efforts to gauge 
citizen attitudes toward participating in such a study, GINA’s 
advocates began to emphasize more heavily its potential to 
facilitate recruitment of subjects for biomedical research.161 
Thus, the GPPC town hall report’s reference to GINA was not 
                                                          
 155. Kathy L. Hudson, Genomics, Health Care, and Society, 365 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 1033, 1038 (2011). 
 156. Genetic Discrimination, GENETIC ALLIANCE, http://
www.geneticalliance.org/advocacy/policyissues/geneticdiscrimination (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2014). 
 157. See id. (mentioning the nearly thirteen years spent by the Genetic 
Alliance to pass GINA). 
 158. S. REP. NO. 110-48, at 13–14. 
 159. S. REP. NO. 108-122, at 1, 14–15 (2003) (summarizing the legislative 
history of GINA). 
 160. S. REP. NO. 110-48, at 13. 
 161. See id. at 1 (“Establishing these protections will allay concerns about 
the potential for discrimination and encourage individuals to participate in 
genetic research . . . .”). 
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incidental, but central to emerging understandings of the 
significance of the legislation.162 
By the mid-2000s, recruitmentologists of many stripes (i.e., 
all those interested in promoting the broad participation of 
citizens in large-scale biomedical research projects) consistently 
identified fear, specifically fear of discrimination, as a primary 
barrier to recruitment.163 Fear as a barrier to be overcome 
became a powerful and pervasive trope in the drive toward the 
ultimate adoption of GINA in 2008. In contrast, concerns over 
individual well-being had been manifest from Representative 
Slaughter’s original legislation in 1995 but never seemed 
sufficient to achieve passage of the bill.164 The 1995 bill had as 
its stated purpose, “[t]o prohibit insurance providers from 
denying or canceling health insurance coverage, or varying the 
premiums, terms, or conditions for health insurance coverage 
on the basis of genetic information or a request for genetic 
services, and for other purposes.”165 When introducing the bill, 
Representative Slaughter spoke of the need to “prevent the 
potentially devastating consequences of discrimination based 
on genetic information,”166 but said nothing there, or in 
subsequent remarks, about fears of discrimination as a barrier 
to research recruitment.167 The bill itself made no mention of 
research.168 Senator Snowe, when introducing her companion 
bill, mentioned that “people may be unwilling to participate in 
potentially ground-breaking research trials because they do not 
                                                          
 162. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 65, at 14 (framing GINA as a way to 
protect privacy and potential misuse of genetic information, two primary 
concerns of town hall participants). 
 163. Kathy L. Hudson et al., Keeping Pace with the Times—The Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2661, 2663 
(2008) (“Studies have shown the ‘fear factor’ to be a major obstacle to patients’ 
participation in research studies that involve the collection of genetic 
information.”). 
 164. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act 
of 1995, H.R. 2748, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995) (emphasizing the protection of 
individuals against discrimination, in addition to providing limits on the 
collection and disclosure of genetic information). 
 165. Id. 
 166. 141 CONG. REC. 36,987 (1995) (statement of Rep. Louise Slaughter). 
 167. See id. at 36,987–88; see also 142 CONG. REC. 6945–46 (1996) 
(statement of Rep. Louise Slaughter). 
 168. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 
1995, H.R. 2748, 104th Cong. (1995). 
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want to reveal information about their genetic status.”169 But 
the bill itself made no reference to research.170 
By 2003, things had changed. That year the Senate held 
full hearings on a direct precursor to GINA, introduced again 
by Senator Snowe.171 The bill itself, while clearly animated by a 
concern to prevent invidious discrimination, also prominently 
mentions in its initial statement of findings that the law was 
“necessary to fully protect the public from discrimination and 
allay their concerns about the potential for discrimination, 
thereby allowing individuals to take advantage of genetic 
testing, technologies, research, and new therapies.”172 The 
Senate report accompanying the bill, opened with a clear 
declaration that, 
The purpose of this legislation is to protect individuals from 
discrimination in health insurance and employment on the basis of 
genetic information. Establishing these protections will allay 
concerns about the potential for discrimination and encourage 
individuals to participate in genetic research and to take advantage 
of genetic testing, new technologies, and new therapies. The 
legislation will provide substantive protections to those individuals 
who may suffer from actual genetic discrimination now and in the 
future. These steps are essential to fulfilling the promise of the 
human genome project.173 
The report here cast GINA as an adjunct to recruitmentology—
a means to overcome the barrier of fear that might obstruct 
participation in research.174 As the HGP came to a conclusion, 
lawmakers were addressing the perceived need to recruit 
individuals into the next phase of the genomic enterprise. By 
invoking the “promise of the human genome project,” 
lawmakers also made demands on fellow legislators to adopt 
the bill or else, by implication, be responsible for frustrating 
the potential of genomic medicine.175 
                                                          
 169. 142 CONG. REC. 8504 (1996) (statement of Sen. Olympia Snowe). 
 170. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 
1996, S. 1694, 104th Cong. (1996). 
 171. S. REP. NO. 108-122, at 13–15 (2003). 
 172. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 
2003, S. 1053, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003). 
 173. S. REP. NO. 108-122, at 1–2 (2003) (emphasis added). 
 174. See id. at 1 (including the encouragement of participation in research 
in the purpose and summary section of the report). 
 175. See id. at 1–2 (“These steps are essential to fulfilling the promise of 
the human genome project.”). 
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This too was not accidental. As debates about GINA 
unfolded in the 2000s, critics expressed the view that fears of 
discrimination were irrational because there had been little or 
no evidence of any significant genetic discrimination, nor would 
there likely be any.176 Others had been stating for years that 
they saw no problem with certain forms of genetic 
discrimination—particularly in the area of insurance, where, 
they argued, preventing access to genetic information might 
allow individuals to game the system.177 As GINA progressed, 
such criticisms threatened to undermine this major rationale 
for its passage. They did not, however, weaken the rationale of 
using GINA to promote research recruitment. If fears of 
discrimination, whether justified or not, were real and 
impeding recruitment, then GINA would still be needed to 
realize the full potential of genomic medicine. 
Many of these views were in evidence in comments 
presented to the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, 
Health, and Society (SACGHS) in 2004.178 The Committee was 
created in 2002 to explore a broad array of health and societal 
issues raised by new genetic technologies and to make 
recommendations to the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services as needed.179 In the fall of 2004 the SACGHS solicited 
                                                          
 176. E.g., Louis P. Garrison et al., A Review of Public Policy Issues in 
Promoting the Development and Commercialization of Pharmacogenomic 
Applications: Challenges and Implications, 40 DRUG METABOLISM R. 377, 395 
(claiming that there is “virtually no evidence of genetic discrimination in the 
insurance market”); Mark A. Hall & Stephen S. Rich, Laws Restricting Health 
Insurers’ Use of Genetic Information: Impact on Genetic Discrimination, 66 
AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 293, 293 (2000) (“[W]e found that a person with a 
serious genetic condition who is presymptomatic faces little or no difficulty in 
obtaining health insurance.”). 
 177. E.g., Colin S. Diver & Jane Maslow Cohen, Genophobia: What is 
Wrong with Genetic Discrimination?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1456–59 (2001) 
(describing the distortions and disturbances that might result in an insurance 
industry denying access to genetic testing results); Richard Epstein, The Legal 
Regulation of Genetic Discrimination: Old Responses to New Technology, 74 
B.U. L. REV. 1, 12–13, (1994). 
 178. See generally SEC’YS ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, 
PUBLIC PERSPECTIVES ON GENETIC DISCRIMINATION, SEPTEMBER 2004–
NOVEMBER 2004 (2004), available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/
reports/Public_Perspectives_GenDiscrim.pdf (compiling comments from the 
public and health care professionals on genetic discrimination). 
 179. See Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society 
Archives, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, http://osp.od.nih.gov/office-clinical-research-
and-bioethics-policy/genetics-health-and-society/sacghs-archives (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2014). 
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input from the general public and health professionals 
specifically on the issue of genetic discrimination, which it 
compiled into a compendium that it published later that 
year.180 Much of the testimony involved individual stories from 
people who had suffered discrimination in insurance or 
employment.181 They did not directly connect their stories to 
issues of research participation, but were concerned primarily 
to show that fear of discrimination was not irrational or 
unfounded.182 
In contrast, a statement by an executive from Aetna, made 
“[o]n [b]ehalf of America’s Health Insurance Plans”183 asserted 
that the idea that insurers would use genetic information to 
discriminate was a myth.184 Myriad Genetics, whose patents on 
breast cancer genes made it a major player in the field of 
diagnostic tests, similarly cast fears of discrimination as 
unfounded.185 Instead of dismissing such fears as irrational, 
however, Myriad insisted they be addressed by “comprehensive 
legislation”186 in order “to allow the public to participate in the 
benefits of genetic medicine,”187 (i.e., their product). These 
sentiments were echoed in the statement from another 
diagnostic firm, LabCorp, which asserted that “[t]he benefits of 
genetic testing can only be fully realized when the fear of 
genetic discrimination, and its actual practice, are eliminated 
from the health care system.”188 
Participating in the benefits of genetic medicine thus 
emerged alongside concern to encourage participation in 
research as dual reasons to address fears of discrimination that 
                                                          
 180. See generally SEC’YS ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, 
supra note 178 (including emails, letters, meeting minutes, policy statements, 
reports, and other records). 
 181. See, e.g., id. at 2–20 (providing the statements of Heidi Williams, 
Phadra Malatek, Rebecca Fisher, Tonia Phillips, and Paula Funk). 
 182. See, e.g., id. 
 183. Id. at 109 (providing the statement of Joanne Armstrong, Senior 
Medical Director of Women’s Health Aetna). 
 184. Id. at 114 (arguing that there is “little, if any, empirical evidence that 
genetic information has, or is being misused” by insurance companies). 
 185. Id. at 205 (providing the statement of Gary Martucci, Director of 
Strategic Alliances for Myriad Genetics Laboratories, who claimed that “the 
insurance coverage barrier ha[d] been effectively eliminated . . . . [but] the fear 
of genetic discrimination ha[d] not”). 
 186. Id. at 207. 
 187. Id. at 208. 
 188. Id. at 203. 
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exerted force independently of whether such discrimination 
actually existed. The Senate report directly juxtaposed fear and 
potential as driving frames for GINA.189 The invocation of the 
promise of the HGP was forward-looking. Taking advantage of 
existing therapies, however, would do little to fulfill the 
promise. It was participation in research that the Senate most 
clearly identified as essential to realizing the potential of new 
genomic knowledge to improve health.190 As the report noted a 
few pages on (shifting the frame from “promise” to “potential”): 
Despite the apparent conflict between actual discrimination 
versus the fear or perception of discrimination, consumers remain 
worried that, once acquired by an insurance company or employer, 
genetic information could be used in a discriminatory manner. 
Such concerns about the misuse of genetics are already hindering 
the potential of the human genome project. . . . 
Fear of discrimination, or even potential discrimination, 
threatens society’s ability to use new genetic technologies to 
improve human health and the scientific community’s ability to 
conduct research needed to understand, treat, and prevent disease. 
And, although there may not be proof of widespread 
discrimination, it is difficult to ignore the few, albeit egregious, 
cases that have been publicly documented.191 
Critically, the report acknowledged that actual discrimination 
need not exist as a real threat to individuals to justify GINA.192 
The reality of public perception and fear of discrimination 
themselves posed a sufficient threat to realizing the potential of 
the HGP to warrant legislative action.193 The Senate report 
here framed the real threat to be addressed by GINA as fear, 
and the threatened subject was not the individual but the 
enterprise of genomic medicine itself. 
In his 2007 testimony before Congress on GINA, then-
director of the NHGRI, Francis Collins, neatly exemplified this 
interweaving of fear as a barrier and a threat: 
We stand on the brink of a revolution in healthcare . . . . Yet, 
there is a cloud on the horizon and it is a cloud that has been 
getting darker and more frightening over the course of the last 
more than 12 years, since I have had the privilege of leading the 
genome effort and worrying about this issue, and that is that this 
                                                          
 189. See S. REP. NO. 108-122, at 8 (2003). 
 190. Id. at 1–2. 
 191. Id. at 8. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. (“Many of the problems outlined in this section stem from the lack 
of a comprehensive federal law prohibiting the use of genetic information to 
deny health insurance coverage or affect employment status.”). 
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kind of genetic information, as valuable as it is, might be used 
against people . . . . Unless Americans are convinced this 
information will not be used against them, this era of personalized 
medicine may never come to pass.194 
Collins brackets this statement with the idea of a coming 
revolution and a new era in genomics.195 These advances 
however, lie on a clouded horizon off in the distance. At first, it 
seems that the clouds are the threat of discrimination. In fact, 
however, the way to clear the clouds is not by addressing 
discrimination per se, but rather by convincing Americans that 
they will not be discriminated against. These are two very 
different, though obviously related, things. The real cloud on 
the horizon, then, or the true threat to realizing the promise of 
genomics, is the barrier to participation in research erected by 
fears of discrimination. In her testimony before the same 
committee, Kathy Hudson was quite explicit about this: 
“growing uncertainty and fear threaten the future of genetic 
medicine.”196 
GINA had broad bipartisan support. It was passed by a 
Democratic Congress and signed by the Republican President 
George W. Bush.197 The theme of fear enjoyed a similarly wide 
embrace. In addition to Democratic Representative Louise 
Slaughter and the Republican Senator Olympia Snowe,198 
industry and patient advocacy groups also invoked the specter 
of fear as an obstacle to progress. For example, the 
Personalized Medicine Coalition, representing “a broad 
spectrum of more than 225 innovator, academic, industry, 
patient, provider and payer communities”199 issued a press 
release calling for the passage of GINA because fear of genetic 
discrimination was deterring patients from taking advantage of 
                                                          
 194. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act: Hearing on H.R. 493 
Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 110th 
Cong. 12–13 (2007) (statement of Francis Collins, M.D., Director of National 
Human Genome Research Institute, National Institutes of Health, 
Department of Health and Human Services) (emphasis added). 
 195. See id. at 12. 
 196. Id. at 44 (providing the testimony of Kathy Hudson). 
 197. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) of 2008, NAT’L 
HUM. GENOME RES. INST., http://www.genome.gov/24519851 (last updated 
Mar. 16, 2012) (tracking the passage and legislative chronology of GINA). 
 198. See supra notes 166–67, 169 and accompanying text. 
 199. About the Personalized Medicine Coalition (PMC), PERSONALIZED 
MED. COALITION, http://www.personalizedmedicinecoalition.org/about (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2014). 
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clinical care and making them “less willing to participate in 
studies that search for linkages between genes and disease, to 
enroll in clinical trials for new targeted drugs, or to provide 
samples for DNA analysis to optimize their own disease 
prevention and treatment.”200 
The GPPC clearly echoed this framing of GINA as it 
gauged public attitudes toward participation in large-scale 
genomic research. For example, in 2007, Kathy Hudson, then 
still director of the GPPC (and soon to become Francis Collins’s 
Deputy Director for Science, Outreach, and Policy at the 
NIH),201 emphasized the importance of using law to overcome 
public fear that threatened to impede genomic progress: 
Without comprehensive legal protections, the public fears 
genetic discrimination, and that fear has negative effects on both 
medical research and clinical care. Today, genetics is incorporated 
into almost all areas of clinical research, and scientists are 
proposing massive population-based studies that will enable them 
to identify and distinguish genetic, environmental, and lifestyle-
based contributors to disease. But many potential research 
participants are deterred by the fear that their information could be 
used against them by employers or insurers . . . . The 
nondiscrimination legislation under consideration would allow 
researchers, for the first time, to assure participants that it is 
simply against the law for health insurers or employers to use 
genetic information to discriminate against them.202 
Here, Hudson cast GINA as a recruitment tool that would 
allow researchers to increase participation by allaying fears 
about discrimination. Further, a GPPC Discussion Guide for 
Clinicians explicitly stated that discussing GINA “might help 
your patients feel more comfortable about . . . participating in 
genetic research.”203 
In a similar vein, a 2007 GPPC report found that, despite 
clear support for such testing, there was also widespread public 
                                                          
 200. Press Release, Personalized Med. Coal., Personalized Medicine 
Coalition Applauds Senate Approval of the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act (Apr. 24, 2008), available at http://
www.personalizedmedicinecoalition.org/communications/press-releases/2008-
04-24. 
 201. See infra notes 509–11 and accompanying text. 
 202. Kathy L. Hudson, Prohibiting Genetic Discrimination, 356 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 2021, 2022 (2007) (emphasis added). 
 203. JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., A DISCUSSION 
GUIDE FOR CLINICIANS 3 (2010), available at http://www.dnapolicy.org/
resources/GINAfinal-discussionguide-3June10.pdf. 
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concern about discrimination.204 The survey also found that 
“[t]hree in four Americans support laws to ban such 
discrimination.”205 The report concluded, much like Collins in 
his testimony before Congress, that “[w]ithout such laws, much 
of the promise of the Human Genome Project to identify the 
causes of disease and promote public health is likely to remain 
unfulfilled.”206 The following year, in an article co-authored 
with Hudson and M.K. Holohan, Collins noted that “studies 
have shown the ‘fear factor’ to be a major obstacle to patients’ 
participation in research studies that involve the collection of 
genetic information.”207 The article went on to quote 
Representative Judy Biggert, a co-sponsor of GINA, for the 
proposition that, “[t]his bill unlocks the great promise of the 
Human Genome Project by alleviating the most common fear 
about genetic testing.”208 In this model of genomic progress, 
public willingness to participate in research is a sort of latent 
resource that needs a new law, GINA, in order to be actualized. 
The effectiveness of GINA as a recruitment tool depended on 
its status as a formal law, invoking the authority of the state to 
reassure recruits and surmount the barrier of their fear of 
discrimination. 
Perhaps more significantly, the extensive discourse linking 
GINA to recruitment locates barriers to genomic progress 
external to the enterprise of “science” in the logistical realm of 
getting bodies. In this scheme, the complexities or 
uncertainties of genomics are not themselves barriers to 
progress. Rather, the implicit message is give “science” the 
proper resources and it will somehow naturally realize the 
great potential of genomics. Here the subtle difference between 
promise and potential comes into play as substantive demands 
are being made upon actors external to science (e.g., legislators 
considering the passage of GINA, or later prospective recruits 
to research) to realize its potential. Only through their actions 
may the latent potential of genomics be actualized. It is as if 
                                                          
 204. JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., U.S. PUBLIC 
OPINION ON USES OF GENETIC INFORMATION AND GENETIC DISCRIMINATION 1 
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the science were there, ready and waiting but simply in need of 
some external ingredient to proceed. In the first phase of the 
enterprise, the HGP, the required resources were primarily 
monetary. Now, in this second phase the resources are corporeal. 
In the world of genomic potential, GINA derived its primary 
value from its ability to contribute to mobilizing those bodily 
resources into the service of biomedical research. 
In these discussions of the future of genomics we have a 
progression of identifying and addressing major barriers to 
realizing its full potential. First, to move to the next phase of 
development after the HGP, researchers need to conduct an 
LPS; second, to conduct an LPS they need lots of bodies; third, 
to get bodies they need recruitmentologists; fourth, 
recruitmentologists cannot get bodies without addressing 
subject’s fears of discrimination; fifth, GINA, a piece of 
legislation conceptualized long before the need to recruit people 
to an LPS, emerges as a ready means to address this fear and 
thereby works to make all the preceding steps fall into place. 
This scheme casts fear less as a concern to be addressed than a 
barrier to be overcome. Its salience derives not from the 
likelihood that the fears of discrimination might be realized 
and result in harm to individuals but from the certainty that 
such fears will obstruct the progression of science if not allayed. 
III. CITIZENSHIP: DUTY AS AN ADJUNCT TO 
RECRUITMENT 
Fear is one type of barrier to recruitment. In many 
respects it is relatively straightforward: someone who might 
otherwise be willing to participate in a study holds back 
because of fear of potential discrimination. GINA emerged as a 
potentially effective response. Perhaps an even greater barrier 
to recruitment is inertia; that is, motivating individuals to even 
consider joining a study in the first place.209 In studies of 
specific diseases, individuals with the condition being studied 
have a built-in incentive to participate in research—the hope 
that knowledge gained may directly improve their lives or 
those in the future who share the same condition. This 
incentive is so great as to give rise among bioethicists to a 
                                                          
 209. Cf. Charles W. Lidz & Paul S. Appelbaum, The Therapeutic 
Misconception: Problems and Solutions, 40 MED. CARE (SUPP.) V-55, V-61 
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concern for what has come to be known as the “therapeutic 
misconception”: the belief among potential subjects that 
participating in a research study involving their condition 
might actually be a form of treatment.210 
An LPS is a different sort of study. It involves the 
population at large and is general, not focused on any 
particular condition or disease.211 Individuals have no 
immediate personal stake in participating.212 Recruiters, 
therefore, need some additional means to get people in the 
door. The GPPC town halls explored attitudes toward return of 
results and monetary payments as possible incentives, but also 
appealed to altruism.213 The ideal of serving the common good 
can be a powerful motivator for some people, but it is also a 
somewhat passive and abstract sort of appeal. Recruiters have 
also found a more aggressive adjunct to altruism in recent 
appeals to civic duty as a basis for demanding participation,214 
particularly for a large-scale enterprise such as an LPS that is 
not linked to any specific biomedical advance, such as curing 
diabetes, but only to the general promise of biomedical 
advance. 
In 2009, the year after GINA was signed into law, G. Owen 
Schaefer, Ezekiel J. Emanuel, and Alan Wertheimer, all of the 
Department of Bioethics at the Clinical Center of the National 
Institutes of Health, published an article in JAMA (Journal of 
the American Medical Association) titled, The Obligation to 
Participate in Biomedical Research.215 Ezekiel Emanuel was 
                                                          
 210. See, e.g., G.E. Henderson et al., Clinical Trials and Medical Care: 
Defining the Therapeutic Misconception, 4 PLOS MED. 1735, 1736 (2007) 
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 211. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 36, at 476 tbl.1 (describing how his 
proposed study required “[a] broad range of ages . . . to provide information on 
disorders from infancy to old age”). 
 212. But see infra notes 213–14. 
 213. See, e.g., WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 65, at 8 (describing how 
participants cited “disease prevention and/or treatment” as the most 
important benefits of an LPS). 
 214. See infra notes 228–34 and accompanying text (outlining the civic 
duty argument of C.D. Herrera). 
 215. G. Owen Schaefer, Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Alan Wertheimer, The 
Obligation to Participate in Biomedical Research, 302 JAMA 67, 67 (2009) 
[hereinafter Emanuel et al.]. Though not the first author, I refer subsequently 
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Chair of the Department, and brother to Rahm Emanuel who 
was then President Obama’s chief of staff.216 In a nutshell, the 
article argued that, “[b]iomedical knowledge is a public good, 
available to any individual even if that individual does not 
contribute to it. Participation in research is a critical way to 
support an important public good. Consequently, all have a 
duty to participate.”217 Recognizing the current “social norm” 
where most participants in biomedical research have some sort 
of affirmative stake in the outcome (as in those whose own or 
family member’s condition is being studied), the article used 
the notion of biomedical knowledge as a “public good” to shift 
the burden of participation from the equivalent of an “opt-in” 
system (“individuals participate only if they have good reason 
to do so”) to an “opt-out” system (“individuals should 
participate unless they have a good reason not to”).218 This duty 
to participate has implications far beyond the possible 
implementation of any particular LPS. It frames an entire 
approach to situating the citizen in relation to the enterprise of 
biomedical research in the United States. 
Calling for a duty to participate was not particularly new 
or striking in itself, but three things distinguished this article: 
first, it came at a time when the energies and attention of a 
wide array of genomic researchers, drug developers, and policy 
makers were increasingly looking toward large-scale 
population-based biobanks as essential to moving genomics 
forward from knowledge to application;219 second, it articulated 
a distinctive vision of citizenship as a function of participation 
in research;220 third, it was co-authored by a prominent NIH 
official with direct ties to the White House.221 
The Emanuel et al. article falls in a line of recent debate 
that dates back at least to a 1984 article by bioethicist Arthur 
Caplan titled, Is There a Duty to Serve as a Subject in 
                                                          
to this article as “Emanuel et al.” because Emanuel was the lead official 
involved in the research. 
 216. Ryan Lizza, The Gatekeeper, NEW YORKER (Mar. 2, 2009), 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/03/02/090302fa_fact_lizza?currentP
age=all (describing Rahm Emanuel in his role as President Obama’s chief of 
staff). 
 217. Emanuel et al., supra note 215, at 67. 
 218. Id. at 70. 
 219. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 36, at 475–77. 
 220. See supra notes 217–18 and accompanying text. 
 221. See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
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Biomedical Research?222 Here Caplan reviewed attempts made 
during the previous decade to locate a moral basis for 
participation in biomedical research.223 He discussed 
arguments by physicians such as Walsh McDemott, Louis 
Lasagna, and Leon Eisenberg that the results of biomedical 
research are public goods (much as Emanuel et al. would later 
argue) and hence require a measure of public participation.224 
Caplan then discussed counter arguments by the likes of Hans 
Jonas and Charles Fried to the effect that “it is not self-
evident” that such results are in fact public goods and that 
even if they were, their value does not necessarily outweigh 
concerns for personal autonomy.225 Caplan moved on to make 
his own argument that biomedical research, particularly in the 
context of a research hospital, constituted a sort of “voluntary 
social cooperation”226 and that “any competent person who 
voluntarily seeks out and takes the benefits of care resulting 
from biomedical research can legitimately be said to be a 
consenting participant in the enterprise and, thus, the bearer 
of a duty to share in the costs of producing the desired 
goods.”227 
More recent arguments made since the completion of the 
HGP include a 2003 article by C.D. Herrera that argued for a 
more robust duty to participate, along the lines of jury duty, 
which would actually compel people to serve.228 Herrera argued 
that such a system could remain responsive to principles of 
autonomy and justice “if it centered on broad public education, 
community representation, and a lottery-type selection 
process.”229 In 2005, Rosamund Rhodes, Director of Bioethics 
Education at Mount Sinai School of Medicine, generated much 
debate with her article Rethinking Research Ethics, published 
                                                          
 222. Arthur L. Caplan, Is There a Duty to Serve as a Subject in Biomedical 
Research?, 6 IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES. 1 (1984). 
 223. Id. at 1. 
 224. Id. at 2. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 4. 
 227. Id. 
 228. C.D. Herrera, Universal Compulsory Service in Medical Research, 24 
THEORETICAL MED. 215, 215 (2003) (describing a “system of full civic 
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in the American Journal of Bioethics.230 Invoking language of 
promise and potential that echoed Francis Collins, Rhodes 
asserted that “we stand on the brink of a cascade of insights 
into human genetics and the promise of spectacular related 
advances in biomedical technology.”231 She went on to assert 
that “[w]ithout human subject research, those treatments are 
less likely to be available[;]” therefore “reasonable people 
should endorse policies that make research participation a 
social duty” analogous to paying taxes or jury service.232 Those 
who do not participate still benefit from medical advances and 
are therefore engaged in morally objectionable free riding.233 In 
this scheme, the great promise of biomedical technology 
demands the participation of human subjects to be realized.234 
The duty derives not simply from shared benefits but also from 
a moral imperative to actualize the latent potential of 
genomics. 
Responding to Rhodes, Robert Wachbroit and David 
Wasserman questioned the validity of her analogy to jury 
service and focused particularly on the argument about free 
riding, questioning the idea that non-participants were 
“unfairly benefitting” from the value created by the service of 
participants.235 They concluded that “research participation 
should be seen as a valuable civic activity, like school tutoring, 
volunteer fire-fighting, and neighborhood patrolling. . . . [B]ut 
there is no reason to single it out as the subject of a universal 
duty.”236 Three years later, Immaculada de Melo-Martín 
published A Duty to Participate in Research: Does Social 
Context Matter?, in which she directly took issue with Rhodes’s 
arguments for a universal duty to participate.237 Central to her 
critique was the assertion that Rhodes neglected the context in 
which decisions to participate occur or the specific risks of 
                                                          
 230. Rosamond Rhodes, Rethinking Research Ethics, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 19 
(2005). 
 231. Id. at 25. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 26. 
 235. Robert Wachbroit & David Wasserman, Research Participation: Are 
We Subject to a Duty?, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 48, 48 (2005). 
 236. Id. at 49. 
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participation the subjects might incur.238 Particularly galling to 
de Melo-Martín was the idea that a country such as the United 
States, without universal health insurance, might impose 
duties to participate upon subjects who might have no access to 
the benefits that might result from subsequent research.239 
Additionally, she noted that among the key beneficiaries of 
such a duty would not be the abstract world of scientific 
advancement, but the very material world of multinational 
pharmaceutical corporations who would literally capitalize on 
the knowledge gained and perhaps control the underlying data 
as well.240 
Rhodes’s response to de Melo-Martín, In Defense of the 
Duty to Participate in Biomedical Research,241 elaborated upon 
the free-rider aspects of her previous article, arguing that 
“[b]ecause we each expect ourselves and our loved ones to share 
in the benefits of future medical advances, at least to some 
degree, each of us must participate.”242 Now writing in 2008, 
Rhodes also expressly addressed the issue of biobanks and 
their role in promoting genetic research. “Looking into the 
genetics-informed future,”243 she wrote, 
makes the case even more strongly. The expectation is that 
researchers will learn a great deal more about the human genome 
and the human microbiome and that this new knowledge will allow 
medicine to tailor treatments to individuals. These advances 
promises [sic] to make medicine more effective and, therefore, more 
affordable. The studies, however, will require the development of 
biobank and sample bank repositories with the participation of a 
tremendous number of subjects. To reap the rewards of advancing 
the practice of medicine, broad public participation will be 
required.244 
Here, Rhodes connected the advance of biomedicine directly to 
recruitment for biobanks of the sort that would necessarily 
underpin the type of large-scale population study advocated by 
Francis Collins and explored by the GPPC. As a complement to 
the GPPC’s exploration of willingness and possible incentives 
                                                          
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. at 30. 
 240. Id. at 31–32. 
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Research, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 37, 37 (2008). 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at 38. 
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to participate, Rhodes added the idea of duty.245 Rhodes’s use of 
the passive voice in the last sentence side steps the issue of 
how robust such a requirement might be and who would 
enforce it (and how).246 Nonetheless, it is clear in its directive 
that the imperatives of actualizing the latent potential of 
science (here in the form of the “expectation” and the “promise” 
to make medicine more effective) demand “broad public 
participation.”247 For Rhodes, as for Collins and the GPPC, it 
was all about getting more bodies. 
It was on the heels of this exchange that Emanuel et al. 
published their article in JAMA. Taking a slightly different 
tack from Rhodes, the article carefully distinguished its “public 
good” idea from similar arguments calling for participation 
based on the market idea of “free riding.”248 As defined by the 
authors, free riding “occurs when an individual receives a 
benefit that others pay for and takes advantage of the 
contributors by refusing to share the burden of obtaining it.”249 
While an attractive argument, the authors assert that the idea 
of paying one’s fair share is inapposite to participation in 
research because “[t]he burdens of participating in biomedical 
research that current participants assume are not alleviated 
when other individuals participate.”250 Conceiving of 
biomedical research as a public good surmounts this problem. A 
public good, as defined in the article, has two characteristics: 
“First, one individual’s use of that good does not diminish 
another’s use of that good; and second, it is impractical to 
prevent individuals from using the good.”251 A critique of free 
riding involves imposing an obligation based on paying one’s 
fair share to relieve current burdens on others. In contrast, 
“discharging a public goods obligation makes society better off 
in the future,” thus making it more apt to the case of research 
participation than the free-rider argument.252 
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As Emanuel et al. conceive it, the obligation to participate 
in biomedical research is not so much grounded in a sense of 
fairness (as is free riding) as in a duty to society as a whole—a 
public duty, “[b]ecause the enterprise of biomedical research 
produces the important benefit of medical knowledge that is an 
advantage to all, every individual has an obligation to support 
that system of knowledge generation by participating in 
biomedical research.”253 This obligation, they argue, must be 
understood as an attribute of contemporary citizenship in the 
United States that demands “a cultural and moral change, not 
a legal one.”254 The authors make this connection explicit when 
they state that, “[j]ust as many claim that citizens have an 
obligation to vote even though they are not legally required to 
do so, society should recognize that everyone has an obligation 
to participate in research when it is not excessively 
burdensome to do so.”255 This new attribute of citizenship, then, 
does not involve formal rights and duties (as for example, the 
right to equal protection of the laws or the duty to serve on a 
jury) but rather a developing normative argument about what 
makes a “good citizen”256 in the post-genomic age. 
IV. CITIZENS, GOOD CITIZENS, AND BIO-CITIZENS 
These largely bioethical discussions of the specific duties of 
citizenship in relation to biomedical advancement are 
surprisingly short on theorization or historical 
contextualization of the concept and meaning of citizenship in 
American society. Diverse scholars have invested modern 
citizenship with an array of attributes and characteristics. In 
one typology, Ronald Beiner offers three theoretical 
perspectives on citizenship: liberal, emphasizing the individual 
and individual rights; communitarian, emphasizing the 
cultural or ethnic group and solidarity among those sharing a 
history or tradition; and civic republican, emphasizing “civic” 
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bonds and duties to the polity.257 In one of the most influential 
contemporary discussions of citizenship, T.H. Marshall focuses 
primarily on rights-based liberal conceptions of citizenship, 
which he breaks down into three elements: civil, political, and 
social.258 The civil element involves those rights necessary for 
individual freedom, such as freedom of speech, thought, and 
faith, as well as basic property rights and the right to justice in 
a formal legal system.259 The political element involves the 
right to participate in the exercise of political power—as 
through voting or running for elective office.260 The social 
element involves rights to basic economic welfare and “security 
to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live 
the life of a civilized being according to the standards 
prevailing in society.”261 Marshall goes on to situate these 
rights historically, broadly locating the formative period for 
civil rights in the eighteenth century, political rights in the 
nineteenth, and social rights in the twentieth.262 Citizenship, 
as elaborated through these rights, is a matter of ensuring that 
individuals are accorded a status as full and equal members of 
society.263 
Marshall, however, was primarily concerned with aspects 
of citizenship related specifically to rights.264 As Will Kymlicka 
and Wayne Norman note, “[c]itizenship is not just a certain 
status, defined by a set of rights and responsibilities. It is also 
an identity, an expression of one’s membership in a political 
community.”265 As a function of participation in one’s 
community, they define citizenship as an activity as well as a 
                                                          
 257. Ronald Beiner, Introduction: Why Citizenship Constitutes a 
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status.266 Or as Ruth Lister puts it, citizenship may be 
“conceptualized . . . both as a status, carrying a wide range of 
rights, and as a practice, involving both obligations and 
political participation, broadly defined.”267 
The notion of citizenship as a practice has roots in 
Aristotle’s Politics, in which, as J.G.A. Pocock notes, 
“[c]itizenship is not just a means to being free; it is the way of 
being free itself.”268 Aristotle’s model lies at the root of a civic 
republican conception of citizenship that developed through a 
lineage that includes Machiavelli and Guicciardini in the 
Italian Renaissance into British republican thinkers of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century, such as James 
Harrington; the model ultimately came to play a signal role in 
shaping the ideology of the American Founders.269 Bound up 
with ideals of civic virtue, corruption, and decay, Pocock 
distinguishes civic republicanism from a second “great Western 
definition of the political universe,” expounded by the second 
century Roman jurist Gaius, wherein the individual “became a 
citizen . . . through the possession of things and the practice of 
jurisprudence. . . . A ‘citizen’ came to mean someone free to act 
by law, free to ask and expect the law’s protection . . . . 
Citizenship has become a legal status, carrying with it rights to 
certain things.”270 Here, perhaps, lay the roots of modern 
liberal understandings of the citizen as a bearer of legal rights. 
Feminist scholars have noted that the liberal subject 
historically has been implicitly coded as white and male.271 
These critiques focus on the importance of contextualizing the 
exercise of citizenship within actual historical communities and 
argue that any consideration of citizenship must also involve 
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an examination of the conditions that make it meaningful.272 
Similarly, feminists have challenged civic republican ideals of 
citizenship as grounded in an excessively rigid divide between 
the public and the private, reason and emotion, the particular 
and the universal; in each case, promoting civic ideals that 
exclude, deny or degrade women.273 
Coming specifically to the case of citizenship in the 
American tradition, Michael Schudson focuses on the civic 
republican strain of citizenship to explore the evolving norms of 
what constitutes a “good citizen.”274 Schudson identified four 
historical phases of American civic life, beginning with the 
period of the Founders, which he sees as characterized by a 
“politics of assent” where the personal authority of gentleman 
elites dominated political discourse and action.275 This gave 
way in the early nineteenth century to the era of Jacksonian 
mass democracy where the interpersonal authority of parties, 
coalitions, and electoral majorities ruled the day.276 Early 
twentieth-century Progressive Era reformers emphasized an 
impersonal educational model of democracy, where the good 
citizen was a rational and informed one.277 Finally, since the 
post-war civil rights era, the model of the “rights-bearing 
citizen” has been dominant in our own time, adding law to 
science and expertise as impersonal bases of authority.278 
Schudson makes clear that these models are not strictly 
sequential but accretive, each layering upon the previous, 
perhaps becoming more dominant but never wholly 
supplanting earlier models.279 
As the title of Schudson’s book, The Good Citizen, makes 
clear, he is concerned more with the practice of citizenship than 
with status. In contrast, in her study of contemporary 
American citizenship, Judith Shklar focuses on the idea of 
“standing” arguing that “the struggle for citizenship in America 
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has . . . been overwhelmingly a demand for inclusion in the 
polity, an effort to break down existing barriers to recognition, 
rather than an aspiration to civic participation as a deeply 
involving activity.”280 Central to her analysis of the emblems of 
public standing are the right to vote and the opportunity to 
earn; above all, these are what historically distinguished the 
free white man from the black slave.281 The dignity of work and 
franchise were the key attributes of full standing in the 
American polity.282 Nonetheless, Shklar fully acknowledges 
other components to American citizenship. She cites citizenship 
as “nationality”—a legal condition;283 as “active participation or 
‘good citizenship’”—focusing on practices;284 and the ideal of 
“republican citizenship”—where civic virtue requires constant 
and direct involvement in ruling and being ruled. 285 
Rogers Smith chronicles the darker side of American “civic 
ideals” of status and standing, arguing “that U.S. citizenship 
laws have always expressed illiberal, undemocratic ascriptive 
myths of U.S. civic identity, along with various types of liberal 
and republican ones, in logically inconsistent but politically 
effective combinations.”286 His “multiple traditions” thesis 
holds that these more hierarchical ascriptive ideologies (most 
prominently based on race and gender) have always been 
blended in with liberal and democratic republican civic 
ideologies.287 As a critical complement to Schudson’s analysis of 
the historical phases of American civic life, we have Smith 
asserting that: 
[F]rom Thomas Paine’s identification of European-descended 
American men as the new chosen people of the Protestant God, to 
the Federalists’ and the Whigs’ Anglophilic nativism, to the 
Jeffersonian and Jacksonian doctrines of scientific racism, to the 
stark evolutionary theories of racial and gender hierarchies during 
the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era, U.S. leaders always 
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fostered senses of what made Americans a distinct “people” that 
relied in part on inegalitarian ascriptive themes.288 
The tapestry of American citizenship is thus complex, 
interwoven with many themes and informed by multiple 
ideological traditions. 
V. CONSTRUCTING CITIZENSHIP IN A                        
POST-GENOMIC AGE 
It is within this context that some significant recent social 
science scholarship on modern genomics has begun to explore 
its broader implications for contemporary understandings of 
citizenship.289 Employing terms such as “Genetic 
Citizenship,”290 “Genomic Citizenship,”291 “Biopolitical 
Citizenship,”292 and “Biological Citizenship,”293 these scholars 
examine how the emergence of modern genetics and related 
enterprises have been changing individuals’ understandings of 
their political identities in relation to themselves, their bodies, 
biomedical practices and the state. 
Deborah Heath, Rayna Rapp, and Karen-Sue Taussig 
coined the term “genetic citizenship” to describe an emergent 
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phenomenon whereby individuals “connect[ ] discussions of 
rights, recognitions, and responsibilities to intimate, 
fundamental concerns about heritable identities.”294 Their 
analysis takes aim, in part, at the traditional divide between 
public and private in classical theories of citizenship.295 Their 
notion of citizenship is intimate and involves an ethic of care 
that they connect both to Michel Foucault’s notion of 
“technologies of the self” and to feminist moral philosophy 
emerging from Carol Gilligan’s work on moral development.296 
They argue that organizations built around shared genetic 
traits, such as the lay advocacy group the Genetic Alliance, are 
giving rise to “new forms of democratic participation, blurring 
the boundary between state and society, and between private 
and public interests.”297 They also note, however, a 
phenomenon whereby health advocacy groups that began 
grass-roots mobilizing efforts to make demands on the state for 
resources and support may become corporatized as they go 
national.298 This “corporatization” of grass-roots voluntary 
associations, they argue, “represents not merely assimilation 
into early twenty-first-century capitalist culture, but also a 
strategic intervention, a move to gain access to resources.”299 
Janet Childerhose distinguishes her idea of “genomic 
citizenship” from Heath, Rapp, and Taussig’s genetic 
citizenship by observing that, the latter “describes the claims 
for scientific inclusion by marginalized populations with rare 
genetic disorders,” whereas genomic citizenship “describes the 
geneticization of all Americans by some genetic activists.”300 In 
her study of the campaign to pass GINA, Childerhose notes 
that these activists, including the same Genetic Alliance 
studied earlier by Heath, Rapp, and Taussig, sought to “enroll 
everyone into a biosociality of a flawed genome that is being 
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made transparent by researchers. According to these activists, 
all Americans are members of the ‘genetics community,’ 
whether they realize it or not,” because we all have flaws in our 
genome.301 Childerhose argues that while this model of 
citizenship may appear inclusive and egalitarian, it is actually 
coercive in its insistence that “all Americans . . . take 
responsibility for their genetic liabilities” and lays the 
foundations for discrimination against those who fail to 
conform to this norm of good genomic citizenship.302 
Nikolas Rose and Carlos Novas frame “biological 
citizenship” as a more general version of genetic citizenship 
and place it in the context of a tradition of “citizenship 
projects,” which they define as “the ways in which authorities 
thought about (some) individuals as potential citizens, and the 
ways in which they tried to act upon them.”303 They argue that 
“specific biological presuppositions . . . have underlain many 
citizenship projects,” and use the term “biological citizenship” 
descriptively “to encompass all those citizenship projects that 
have linked their conceptions of citizens to beliefs about the 
biological existence of human beings, as individuals, as families 
and lineages, as communities, as population and races, and as 
a species.”304 Echoing the arguments of Heath, Rapp, and 
Taussig, Rose and Novas assert that solidaristic ties formed 
through biological commonalities allow groups to make certain 
types of ethical demands—on themselves, on communities, and 
on the state.305 These demands may come through the sort of 
advocacy groups identified by Heath, Rapp, and Taussig;306 in 
contrast to their conceptualization of genetic citizenship as a 
basis for solidaristic organization and political engagement, 
Rose and Novas foreground the consumerist attributes of 
biological citizenship, presenting the human body as an object 
to be targeted by enhancement technologies in a global market 
that exists separate from nation-states.307 As they put it, “[t]his 
is the citizenship of brand culture, where trust in brands 
appears capable of supplanting trust in neutral scientific 
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expertise.”308 Like Childerhose, Rose and Novas note that 
biological citizenship also makes demands on subjects “to 
inform him- or herself not only about current illness, but also 
about susceptibilities and predispositions. . . . [and] to take 
appropriate steps” to minimize the risk of illness and maximize 
health.309 As consumers, biological citizens have duties, but 
unlike those articulated by Emanuel et al., these duties 
primarily involve their own self-fashioning rather than 
participating in a common enterprise for the greater good.310 
Some critics have expressed concerns that this vision of 
citizenship, with its apparent celebration of citizenship as a 
function of consumption, is a dangerous departure from more 
traditional conceptions of social and political citizenship.311 
Childerhose’s argument that the campaign for GINA 
involved casting the entire nation as a genomic citizens jibes 
with Shklar’s focus on citizenship as standing with its 
concomitant demand for inclusion in the polity. Yet, as Steven 
Epstein ably shows, inclusion in the life sciences can be 
complex and contested, implicating politics that may 
exacerbate inequalities even as it is trying to address them.312 
Shklar’s idea of citizenship focused on the quest for civic 
inclusion as full members of the polity. Epstein’s biopolitical 
citizens, in contrast, seek inclusion primarily as subjects of 
biomedical research.313 Inclusion also may be double edged 
insofar as the grant of standing may also impose duties.314 The 
duties elaborated by previous analyses of the diverse facets of 
modern genetic or biological citizenship focus primarily on 
issues of individual self-care, education, and consumption. 
Ironically, even as these models involve genetic identities 
forming the basis for new communal ties, they reproduce 
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classically liberal conceptions of citizens as atomized individual 
consumers—making demands for particular goods and services. 
This last model of citizen as consumer actually has its 
roots in Progressive Era America.315 As Schudson notes, this 
period was marked by a shift to impersonal authority grounded 
in the authority of science and law, where a good citizen was an 
informed and rational one.316 Progressive reformers worked 
diligently to recast citizenship as a function of consuming 
information about government and then using their vote as a 
means, in effect, to purchase the leaders and policies they 
preferred.317 Central to this reconfiguration of citizenship was a 
national campaign to create public budgets at all levels of 
government.318 Difficult as it may be to conceive today, no 
governmental entity in the United States had anything looking 
like a modern budgetary system before the twentieth 
century.319 Budget reformers of the Progressive Era conceived 
of public budgets as presenting fundamental information about 
the constitution of government to the people.320 They deemed 
access to such information as critical to maintaining a viable 
representative democracy in modern, urban, industrialized 
society.321 This scheme effectively aimed to deracinate 
citizenship by realigning its duties from old schemes of 
deference to elites or tribal party affiliation toward the rational 
and systematic consumption of information about the working 
of the state as presented through well-publicized budgets.322 
This involved quite literally putting the state on display.323 
In 1908, New York City inaugurated the first of several grand 
“Budget Exhibits,” something akin to the public fairs and 
expositions that swept the country in the preceding decades but 
focused on graphically representing the functions of local 
government to the citizens.324 Over one million people attended 
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the last and grandest of these annual exhibits, held during the 
month of October, 1911.325 As budget reform went national 
with the passage of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, 
this function was taken over by the budget document itself, 
which purported to present a detailed public accounting of 
governmental priorities and allocation of resources.326 In some 
respects, one may (somewhat anachronistically) consider the 
budget to have been understood as an early political analogue 
to DNA—information deemed fundamentally constitutive, not 
of the body, but of the body politic. 
Whereas the budget reformers of the early twentieth 
century deemed consumption of budgetary information about 
the state to be a preeminent mark of the “good” citizen,327 
modern analysts of biotechnology, particularly Rose and Novas, 
see consumption of genetic information about the self to be the 
distinguishing feature of the “good” citizen in the early twenty-
first century.328 The former model of deracinated citizenship 
aimed to strip personal identity from a civic life based on 
science and expertise but was ultimately oriented toward the 
state and a sense of common civic obligation to a larger public 
good. The latter model layers new genetic identities on 
citizenship, creating the basis for new types of communal 
bonds, but it is ultimately oriented toward corporations and the 
market as source of redress for their concerns. 
In a sense, what has happened here is a shift from an early 
twentieth-century model of the citizen as consumer to an early 
twenty-first-century model of the consumer as citizen. Both, 
perhaps, are grounded in Lawrence Friedman’s 
characterization of twentieth century America as a “Republic of 
Choice.”329 Friedman contrasts the self-disciplined 
individualism of the nineteenth century with the self-
expressive individualism of the twentieth century in which “the 
right to ‘be oneself,’ to choose oneself, is placed in a special and 
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privileged position.”330 The literal refashioning of the embodied 
self-enabled by modern biotechnology marks perhaps the 
apotheosis of this vision. The result is a kind of republican 
consumerism, where one’s duty to the polity is exercised 
through market virtues, not civic ones. Where earlier groups 
based campaigns for voting rights or school desegregation on 
civic standing and inclusion as a function of human dignity, the 
inclusion sought by genetic citizens often involves demands for 
access to biotechnological products. 
VI. PRIVATIZING CITIZENSHIP 
How then, do recent efforts at recruitment for large-scale 
genomic population studies and Emanuel et al.’s call for an 
obligation to participate in research fit into the traditions of 
American citizenship? In analogizing the duty to participate in 
biomedical research to the duty to vote, Emanuel et al. clearly 
frame it as civic, a central attribute of good citizenship in the 
communitarian or civic republican strains that emphasize 
virtuous practice.331 The idea here is that participating in 
biomedical research is a kind of public service.332 They are not 
alone in this general approach, but it involves a critical shift 
from a liberal, rights-focused conception of an active citizenry 
of patient advocacy groups making demands of biomedical 
researchers, to recruiters invoking a civic republican duty-
based model of citizenship to make demands of potential 
subjects. As Steven Epstein notes, early health activists 
“invoked ideas of citizenship to demand that researchers attend 
to the health research needs of disadvantaged groups, 
investigators seeking to recruit subjects have counterposed 
such citizenship rights with citizenship duties: the good citizen 
is one who volunteers on behalf of his or her community.”333 
Epstein focused on “community” largely as a term related to 
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fellow sufferers,334 much as did Heath, Rapp, and Taussig.335 
Emanuel et al., however, move beyond the notion of a 
community of fellow sufferers to extend the call of duty to all 
citizens,336 more in line with Childerhose’s notion of a genomic 
citizenship that embraces us all.337 
Emanuel et al. also stand out in their explicit embrace of 
the idea that service to the community is to be realized first 
through service to the needs of private corporations.338 Unlike 
voting, which ostensibly manifests a form of citizen control over 
the state, participating in biomedical research introduces the 
citizen-subject into a commercial nexus that extracts value 
from her body while conferring no control whatsoever over the 
ultimate disposition of the knowledge and products derived 
therefrom.339 Emanuel et al. are aware of this problem and 
address it by trying to elide the difference between private gain 
and ultimate service to the final good of public health.340 To a 
certain degree, this elision may be understood as a sort of civic 
analogue to the therapeutic misconception. Where the classic 
therapeutic misconception involves blurring the distinction 
between research and therapy,341 its civic analogue—a civic 
misconception, as it were—here blurs the distinction between 
biomedical service to one’s community and commercial service 
to a corporation. Demanding the right to participate in a trial 
to promote the interests of your biomedical-identified political 
community—as in the case of AIDS activists in the late 1970s 
and early 1990s342—is one thing; positing a duty for all citizens 
to participate may sound like a similar kind of call for 
                                                          
 334. Id. 
 335. Heath et al., supra note 290, at 152–67; Taussig, Hoeyer & Helmreich, 
supra note 17, at S10–S12. 
 336. Emanuel et al., supra note 215, at 68–70. 
 337. Childerhose, supra note 291, at 335. 
 338. Emanuel et al., supra note 215, at 71. 
 339. Cf. id. at 71 (“[I]t could be objected that patented biomedical 
knowledge is not a public good, and hence participation in industry-sponsored 
research that may produce patented knowledge is not an obligation.”). 
 340. Id. at 70–71. 
 341. Lidz & Appelbaum, supra note 210, at V57. 
 342. EPSTEIN, supra note 292, at 118–24. See generally STEVEN EPSTEIN, 
IMPURE SCIENCE: AIDS, ACTIVISM, AND THE POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE (1996) 
[hereinafter EPSTEIN, IMPURE SCIENCE], available at http://
publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft1s20045x;chunk.id=
0;doc.view=print (discussing the changing role of activism within the AIDS 
movement). 
2014] PRIVATIZING BIOMEDICAL CITIZENSHIP 845 
 
inclusion, but it is externally imposed and only indirectly 
serves the public good through the vehicle of a corporate 
intermediary which holds all substantive control over the 
process and its products. 
When dealing with a public good such as biomedical 
knowledge, Emanuel et al. declare, “[w]ho provides the good is 
irrelevant to whether it is public or private. A private company 
might provide a public good like fireworks, whereas a 
government could provide unemployment benefits, which is a 
private good because it can be given to unemployed individuals 
but not to others.”343 This, of course, overlooks the fact that 
private companies do not provide fireworks for free, nor do 
construction companies build roads and schools for free. They 
do so pursuant to government contracts that specify the terms 
and conditions of the service. Such is not the case with 
pharmaceutical and medical device developers.344 Perhaps a 
more apt analogy would be to the building of railroads across 
the old West, which involved a massive transfer of public assets 
(i.e., land) to private railroad companies.345 In the case of 
biomedical research, however, the massive transfer of assets 
does not involve exploiting land but the bodies of citizens. 
Perhaps most striking is the contrast between Emanuel et 
al.’s model and the civic ideals promulgated from the 
Progressive Era ideal up through modern notions of genetic or 
biological citizenship. These earlier models cast the citizen as a 
consumer whose primary duty was to take in information 
(whether about the state or about their own biological 
condition) and act on it in a reasoned and responsible 
manner.346 In characterizing participation as a duty of 
citizenship, Emanuel et al. recast the good citizen from being a 
consumer to being herself an object of consumption.347 The 
early twentieth-century model citizen was encouraged to 
consume political information about the state; the early 
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twenty-first century genetic or biomedical citizen was 
encouraged to consume biological information about him- or 
herself; and Emanuel et al.’s ideal citizen herself becomes a 
source of information that is consumed by corporate drug 
developers. The citizen moves from being a consumer to being 
the consumed. 
This latest model of citizenship is complementary to that of 
Rose and Novas. The biomedical products that Rose and 
Novas’s good biocitizen is duty-bound to consume are produced 
through the participation of Emanuel et al.’s good citizen in 
biomedical research. Each model, however, implicates 
privatization and power differently. Rose and Novas’s model 
privatizes citizenship simply insofar as the good biocitizen 
exercises her primary duties—of informed self-care and 
consumption of biomedical interventions—in the private realm 
of the marketplace.348 The model elaborated by Emanuel et al., 
and in related endeavors such as the GPPC town halls, 
privatizes citizenship more profoundly by conscripting the core 
values and meaning of citizenship into the service of private 
corporate entities, thereby commodifying citizenship as a 
resource to be exploited for commercial product development.349 
Consider further how the original politics of budgets and of 
biomedicine were both built on display: the one putting the 
state on display through exhibits that employed such cutting 
edge technology as film (to show, for example, the fire 
department putting out a fire);350 the other putting the body on 
display through such similarly cutting edge technologies as gel 
electrophoresis, magnetic resonance imaging, and electron 
microscopes.351 In the early twentieth century the state was to 
be put on display to the citizens as a basis for reasoned political 
action; in the early twenty-first century one’s body was to be 
put on display to oneself as a basis for reasoned self-care. In 
Emanuel et al.’s model, however, one’s body is to be put on 
display to biomedical researchers as a basis for product 
development.352 
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Nonetheless, Emanuel et al. assert that because “the 
enterprise of biomedical research” produces the public good of 
medical knowledge, which benefits all, it creates an obligation 
for all to support it.353 They readily acknowledge that the great 
majority of such research is sponsored by pharmaceutical 
corporations, but argue that since a private company can 
provide a public good, “there can be obligations to help private 
companies produce public goods.”354 Keith Faulks notes that 
the obligations of citizenship “may be seen as . . . an expression 
of solidarity and empathy with others.”355 Certainly this is the 
feeling Emanuel et al. wish to invoke. But under their model 
citizen research subjects express their sympathy and solidarity 
elsewhere—with private companies.356 The fact that such 
private companies may patent the public good of biomedical 
knowledge produced by broad citizen participation does not 
trouble them because patents eventually expire and in any 
event, the knowledge underlying the patent remains public.357 
This model also imposes duty asymmetrically. Here the 
good citizen has an obligation to contribute to the production of 
the public good of biomedical knowledge by serving as a human 
subject for research.358 The corporation, however, has no 
corresponding duty whatsoever. Rather, it is merely assumed 
that the logic of the market will impel the corporation to 
develop that knowledge rapidly and efficiently into an effective 
product that improves human health.359 The corporation may 
patent the knowledge, charge fees for the product that place it 
out beyond the reach of many of the same human subjects who 
provided the information critical to its development, strike 
deals with potential generic manufacturers (if the product is a 
drug) to stave off early introduction of lower priced 
alternatives, lobby for and exploit tax preferences for research 
and development, withhold information from the public about 
negative results, skew clinical trial designs to favor their 
                                                          
 353. Id. at 68. 
 354. Id. at 71. 
 355. KEITH FAULKS, CITIZENSHIP 82 (2000). 
 356. Emanuel et al., supra note 215, at 71. 
 357. Id. 
 358. Caplan, supra note 222, at 4. 
 359. Id. at 2 (discussing how the first step to the production of new drugs is 
the participation of citizens thus inferring that a reliance exists but not a duty 
to produce new drugs). 
848 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 15:2 
 
products, conduct misleading marketing campaigns, and so 
forth360—all without offending any duty to serve the public 
good. The model thoroughly decontextualizes the production of 
biomedical knowledge, stripping it of any connection to the 
actual conditions under which corporations conduct research, 
development, and marketing. 
This is more than the sort of “enclosure” of the human 
genome through patenting examined by critics such as James 
Boyle361 and recently litigated in the case of Association for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics.362 It is the 
appropriation of the embodied citizenry—a privatization of 
citizenship itself. Emanuel et al.’s ideal citizen owes a duty not 
to the state but to private corporations, which, they assume 
will go on to provide public goods.363 The conditions under 
which such goods are provided are irrelevant for them. In 
contrast to the model of activist groups, such as the Genetic 
Alliance, who use genetic identities to enlist individuals into 
groups that can make claims on the state (or on 
corporations),364 Emanuel et al. use biological identity (as 
broadly conceived by Rose and Novas) to make claims on the 
individual. Where basic duties of self-care and education still 
involve a sense of duty to the civic community—particularly to 
fellow-sufferers—the duty to participate in corporate research 
is owed primarily and directly to the private corporation.365 
Such a duty may be conceived of as civic only to the extent that 
it is mediated through the presumed ability of the corporation 
to serve the larger public good.366 Here the locus of engagement 
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where a citizen discharges her duty is not the public sphere of 
civic space, it is the private clinical research trial.367 The citizen 
does not engage with other citizens, articulate, or make 
demands; rather the citizen is himself articulated, rendered 
transparent, open, and susceptible to exploitation—in the name 
of science but in the service of the corporate enterprise.368 
Finally, to the extent that the very concept of citizenship itself 
is a public resource, capable of mobilizing and directing loyalty, 
allegiance, and related civic virtues, this call to serve 
biomedical research transfers the authority of the state to 
make claims based on citizenship into the hands of private 
enterprise.369 
From the GPPC’s town halls to Emanuel et al.’s focus on 
duty, these initiatives are developing a model of biomedical 
citizenship that is characterized by market negotiation (as in 
the GPPC focus group research), consumerist practices (as 
observed by Rose and Novas), and product development (the 
ultimate goal of Emanuel et al.’s call to participate in research). 
To the extent that rights (such as access to information or 
return of research results) matter at all, they are only those 
rights that individuals are able to bargain for through the sort 
of market-mediated quid pro quo presented in the GPPC 
discussion groups. This model privatizes biomedical citizenship 
as a function of market relations by appropriating civic 
republican traditions of the practices of good citizenship to 
enlist the populace to serve private corporate interests while 
obscuring or marginalizing the liberal tradition’s focus on the 
individual rights of citizenship conferred by virtue of one’s basic 
status as a member of the political community. 
VII. CALL OF DUTY: THE MILLION VETERAN 
PROGRAM 
The story here takes a brief detour to the Department of 
Veterans Affairs (VA), where a parallel large population study 
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initiative emerged invoking similar but distinctly military 
tropes of duty and service to recruit participants.370 Since our 
founding, the citizen-soldier has been a central figure in 
constructing ideals of America citizenship.371 During the 
American Revolution the symbol of the Roman patrician 
Cincinnatus, who left his plow to take up arms and then 
returned to civilian life, became a model of civic virtue for the 
citizen-soldiers fighting for the new republic.372 America’s 
oldest patriotic organization, the Society of the Cincinnati, was 
founded in 1783 to honor this ideal.373 
In 2007, while it was working in conjunction with the NIH 
to develop its scheme of town halls and surveys to assess 
attitudes among the general public toward participating in 
genetic research, the GPPC also received nearly half a million 
dollars to assess the attitudes toward genetic research and 
genomic medicine of veterans who receive their health care 
through the VA.374 This project was deliberately conceived as a 
companion to the GPPCs work for the NIH.375 As the GPPC 
noted at the time, working with the VA presented a distinct 
opportunity because it is one of the largest health care systems 
in the United States, providing care to over 5.3 million patients 
with an integrated electronic medical record system.376 The 
GPPC conducted a survey of 931 veterans enrolled in the VA 
health system about attitudes toward participating in a VA-
based biobank to conduct research on issues of distinct interest 
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to veterans, such as possible genetic factors affecting post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).377 A large majority of 
respondents supported the idea of creating such a database, 
with seventy-one percent indicating they would definitely or 
probably participate.378 
With these results in hand, the VA launched the Million 
Veteran Program (MVP) in 2011.379 As described by the VA: 
MVP is a national, voluntary research program funded entirely by 
the Department of Veterans Affairs Office of Research & 
Development. The goal of MVP is to partner with Veterans 
receiving their care in the VA Healthcare System to study how 
genes affect health. To do this, MVP will build one of the world’s 
largest medical databases by safely collecting blood samples and 
health information from one million Veteran volunteers. Data 
collected from MVP will be stored anonymously for research on 
diseases like diabetes and cancer, and military-related illnesses, 
such as post-traumatic stress disorder.380 
On November 11, 2013, the VA announced it had enrolled its 
200,000th participant in the program, making it the largest 
research program ever conducted by the VA.381 It hopes to 
reach its goal of one million enrolled veterans by 2017.382 
Reporting and promotional materials on the MVP 
repeatedly invoke tropes of service, comradeship, and duty.383 
Given the military context, such framings seem to have been 
far more readily accepted and generally less contested than 
Emanuel et al.’s similar call to duty in a civilian context.384 The 
                                                          
 377. Jane Sherwin, New VA Program Could Pave the Way for Personalized 
Care, AAMC REPORTER (July 2011), https://www.aamc.org/newsroom/
reporter/july11/254618/veterans.html; see Carolyn Johnson, Veterans Taking 
Part in Massive DNA Project, KGO-TV (Jan. 4, 2012), http://abclocal.go.com/
kgo/story?section=news/health&id=8490606. 
 378. Sherwin, supra note 377. 
 379. Id. 
 380. Million Veteran Program, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF. (last updated 
Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.research.va.gov/mvp/default.cfm. 
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NEWS & OBSERVER (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.newsobserver.com/2012/
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 384. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, The Million Veteran 
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[hereinafter Genomics Game-Changer], available at http://www.va.gov/opa/
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VA describes the MVP as a “partnership with veterans”385 that 
is well-positioned to succeed “thanks to its large, diverse, and 
altruistic patient population.”386 Similarly, Dr. Joel 
Kupersmith, the VA’s chief research and development officer 
expressed confidence about subject recruitment because “vets 
are very altruistic people and they’re likely to help if you tell 
them it will benefit someone else.”387 
News reports of the MVP have repeatedly cited veterans’ 
own invocations of service and duty as underlying their 
decision to participate.388 “It’s just one more way to serve my 
country,” said Army veteran Clarence Gray.389 Becky 
Carpenter, a third generation veteran, framed her participation 
as growing out of her “strong history of service,” casting the 
MVP as another opportunity for veterans “to serve our 
country.”390 Marine Corps veteran Andrew Peters, enrolling in 
California, framed participation as a duty to the service, to 
medicine and to each other.391 The sense of duty to each other 
also invokes ideals of military fraternity echoed by JD LeBlanc, 
a Vietnam veteran who said he enrolled because “[a]nything I 
can do to help future vets is worthwhile.”392 Similarly, Robert 
Stephens, assistant Army chaplain in the Vietnam War 
asserted that “[w]e have to help each other.”393 Throughout, 
powerful tropes of duty and service—specifically military 
attributes of good citizenship—frame the efforts to recruit 
veterans into a massive genomic research project. Though 
running on a parallel course to the NIH efforts to develop an 
                                                          
pressrel/pressrelease.cfm?id=2090 (discussing a willingness to help other 
veterans with the “care they have earned”). 
 385. Million Veteran Program, supra note 380. 
 386. Genomics Game-Changer, supra note 384. 
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Genetic Mysteries, BALTIMORE SUN (Feb. 5, 2012), http://
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 388. Id.; Price, supra note 383. 
 389. Price, supra note 383. 
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 391. Johnson, supra note 377. 
 392. Moulton, supra note 390. 
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LPS, the MVP similarly invoked, perhaps even more explicitly, 
ideals of duty and service as a tool of recruitment. 
VIII. THE PROBLEM OF CONSENT: REVISING THE 
COMMON RULE 
Coming back to the civilian sector: to this point we have 
had Francis Collins calling for a large cohort population study 
to follow on the heels of the completion of the HGP;394 the NIH 
enlisting the GPPC to conduct preliminary studies exploring 
how best to recruit people to such a study;395 and Emanuel et 
al. positing a moral obligation to participate in order to get 
willing recruits in the door.396 The next essential piece to 
proceeding with research is to obtain the subjects’ consent. At 
the federal level, questions of consent in human subject 
research are most fully dealt with under a series of regulations 
first issued in 1991 that have come to be known as the 
“Common Rule,” codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46.397 
The Common Rule governs eighteen federal departments 
and agencies (most prominently the Department of Health and 
Human Services) and applies as well to all research funded by 
the agencies.398 The Rule generally requires informed consent, 
independent ethical review by Institutional Review Boards 
(IRBs), and the minimization of avoidable risks.399 The Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA), while not formally covered by 
the Common Rule, applies essentially the same standards to all 
research supporting submissions for regulatory approval.400 
The concerns for human subjects protections embodied in 
the Common Rule have their roots in the Nuremberg Code, 
promulgated in the aftermath of World War II, and revelations 
of Nazi abuses of prisoners for research.401 At the core of the 
                                                          
 394. See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text. 
 395. See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text. 
 396. Emanuel et al., supra note 215, at 67. 
 397. 45 CFR 46—FAQs, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, 
http://answers.hhs.gov/ohrp/categories/1562 (last visited Jan. 24, 2014). 
 398. Id. 
 399. Id. 
 400. For a chart of the differences between FDA regulations and the 
Common Rule, see Comparison of FDA and HHS Human Subject Protection 
Regulations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/
SpecialTopics/RunningClinicalTrials/educationalmaterials/ucm112910.htm 
(last updated Mar. 10, 2009). 
 401. Rhodes, supra note 230, at 21–22. 
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Code is a concern for informed consent and a balancing of risks 
and benefits to protect the human subject.402 In 1964 the World 
Health Association adopted additional “Recommendations 
Guiding Medical Doctors in Biomedical Research Involving 
Human Subjects” in its Declaration of Helsinki.403 The 
Declaration has been revised many times since. Like the 
Nuremberg Code, it is also concerned with consent and also 
extensively discusses the management of risk to the human 
subject.404 In particular, its most current iteration specifies 
that research “must be preceded by careful assessment of 
predictable risks and burdens to the individuals and 
communities involved in the research in comparison with 
foreseeable benefits to them and to other individuals or 
communities affected by the condition under investigation;”405 
that “[p]hysicians may not participate in a research study 
involving human subjects unless they are confident that the 
risks involved have been adequately assessed and can be 
satisfactorily managed;”406 and that “[m]edical research 
involving human subjects may only be conducted if the 
importance of the objective outweighs the inherent risks and 
burdens to the research subjects.”407 
Revelations of research abuses such as the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study in the early 1970s led to the passage in 1974 of 
the National Research Act,408 which created the Commission 
for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research.409 Four years later the Commission 
published Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection 
of Human Subjects of Research, known as the Belmont Report, 
which became a foundational document for contemporary 
                                                          
 402. See The Nuremberg Code, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/nurcode.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2014). 
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Implications, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/tuskegee/after.htm (last updated Sept. 24, 2013). 
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bioethics in the United States.410 Using the Belmont Report as 
a guide, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
began to revise and expand its regulations governing human 
subjects research.411 This work evolved into the uniform set of 
regulations adopted as the Common Rule in 1991.412 
In July 2011, less than two years after Emanuel et al. 
published their call for a civic obligation to participate in 
biomedical research, HHS published an advanced notice of 
proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) concerning possible revisions to 
the Common Rule.413 The announcement noted that “[t]he 
current regulations governing human subjects research were 
developed years ago when research was predominantly 
conducted at universities, colleges, and medical institutions, 
and each study generally took place at only a single site.”414 
Expansion of human subject research into many new scientific 
disciplines and venues and an increase in multi-site studies 
have highlighted ambiguities in the current rules and have led 
to questions about whether the current regulatory framework 
is effectively keeping up with the needs of researchers and 
research subjects.415 Consent and IRB review are at the center 
of this problem.416 Most consent protocols commonly limit the 
use of information or biospecimens to the particular study or 
institution where the information is gathered.417 This makes 
open-ended research of the kind called for in a large population 
study exceedingly difficult. As for IRBs, Coleman et al. note 
that the “goal for IRBs is not to eliminate the risks of research, 
but to ensure that the risks have been minimized to the extent 
reasonably possible and that any remaining risks are justified 
by the benefits the study is likely to achieve.”418 Yet, as 
biomedical research has become increasingly complex and 
                                                          
 410. See Belmont Report, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192 (Apr. 18, 1979). 
 411. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for 
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geographically dispersed, many researchers have come to see 
IRB review as excessively burdensome and time-consuming.419 
The ANPRM identified seven key concerns animating the 
call for revisions, focusing broadly on issues relating to risk, 
efficiency, and consent.420 Its “fundamental goal” was “to 
enhance the effectiveness of the research oversight system by 
improving the protections for human subjects while also 
reducing burdens, delays, and ambiguity for investigators and 
research subjects.”421 While unremarkable in itself, this 
framing creates a direct relationship and possible tension 
between providing adequate protections for human subjects 
and increasing the efficiency of the process. Implicitly, 
requirements that protect subjects are cast as presenting 
potential barriers to research and development. While much of 
the ANPRM involves consideration of reducing regulatory 
burdens placed on relatively low-risk social science research,422 
a central component of the proposed revisions focuses on 
expanding existing exemptions from full IRB review (to be 
recast under the heading of “excused” rather than “exempt” 
research) to cover research on biospecimens, provided certain 
new consent requirements are satisfied.423 
Biospecimens provide the foundation for the sort of large-
scale, longitudinal population study called for by Francis 
Collins and presented by the GPPC for consideration in its 
town halls and focus groups.424 They comprise the biobanks 
that provide access to the genetic information that many 
researchers hope may be correlated with ongoing phenotypic 
traits and etiology of particular health conditions over time.425 
Currently, using such information in a research study is 
generally exempt from the burdens of IRB review if the 
information has been “de-identified”—that is, if it cannot be 
                                                          
 419. Human Subjects Research Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. at 44,512–31, 
44,518 (portraying the process as burdensome and asking how to streamline 
it). 
 420. Id. at 44,513. 
 421. Id. at 44,514. 
 422. E.g., id. at 44,516 (providing for “expedited review” for minimal risk 
studies, “particularly those in the social and behavioral field”). 
 423. Id. at 44,515. 
 424. Kaufman et al., supra note 147, at 831. 
 425. Id. at 831–32. 
2014] PRIVATIZING BIOMEDICAL CITIZENSHIP 857 
 
traced back to an individual source.426 The sort of large-scale 
population studies proposed by Collins and the GPPC, however, 
are much more useful if the information can be connected to 
the type of specific phenotypic information that would render 
the biospecimens “identifiable.”427 
The ANPRM addressed this problem by proposing to allow 
open and free use of biospecimens for research from subjects 
who first signed a “brief standard consent form agreeing to 
generally permit future research.”428 All future studies using 
such biospecimens, whether for clinical purposes or not, would 
fall under the new “excused” category and hence “not require 
IRB review or any routine administrative review but would be 
subject to the data security and information protection 
standards” proposed elsewhere in the ANPRM.429 The purpose 
here is to “calibrate[ ]” the levels of review “to [the] . . . degree 
of risk” involved in the research;430 the idea being that review 
itself presents a burden or barrier to the conduct of research 
that needs to be minimized to a degree commensurate with the 
level of risk it is intended to manage. As a result, the previous 
“limitation that the researcher cannot record and retain 
information that identifies the subjects would be eliminated.”431 
The ANPRM casts the risks of biospecimen research as 
primarily informational in nature, involving, for example, the 
unintended release of private information or the public 
identification of basic genetic information with a particular 
individual.432 It proposes a new regime for data security to 
manage such information and therefore argues that “only 
noninformational risks would be considered in determining the 
level of risk posed by research studies.”433 Here, the ANPRM 
neatly casts the risks of biospecimen collection as a matter of 
data management rather than involving ethical questions 
relating to the status of or possible harms to participants.434 It 
                                                          
 426. See Human Subjects Research Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. at 44,527 
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proposes adherence to standards for data security and 
confidentiality modeled on those for health information in the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA).435 The ANPRM would thus transfer risk management 
for biospecimens from IRB review to a technical realm largely 
devoid of ethical considerations, with little oversight or 
accountability.436 
By reconfiguring risk, and hence removing IRB review 
from the realm of biospecimen collection, the ANPRM leaves 
consent as the only major regulatory hurdle to be crossed in 
constructing a biobank for an LPS.437 There are two basic 
components to the consent process: one must, of course, get 
potential subjects actually to consent to participate in the 
research; this consent additionally must be “informed.”438 In 
this regard, the ANPRM’s proposal to allow general open-ended 
consent for all potential future use of identifiable information is 
both very powerful and highly problematic. 
As it turns out, Ezekiel Emanuel was part of the working 
group convened by the Office of Management and Budget to 
consider revisions to the Common Rule that came to be 
published in the ANPRM.439 In 2011, while still at the NIH, 
Emanuel co-authored an article with Jerry Menikoff discussing 
the ANPRM and the rationale for it.440 Published in the New 
England Journal of Medicine, the article largely summarizes 
the main points of the ANPRM.441 It begins by noting that the 
Common Rule has persisted largely unchanged since it was 
first introduced in 1991, while research practices had developed 
dramatically in both size and scope since that time, giving rise 
to much criticism of the current regulatory regime.442 Emanuel 
and Menikoff identify two key themes in these critiques: first, 
“the regulations impose a variety of burdensome bureaucratic 
procedures that seem to do little to protect research 
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participants, yet consume substantial resources;” and second, 
“current regulations could be doing a significantly better job in 
protecting research subjects.”443 They cast regulatory burden 
and risk to human subjects as the two primary barriers to the 
progress of research.444 With respect to biospecimens, the 
proposed revisions deal with the first barrier by removing this 
category of research from IRB review, and with the second by 
redefining risk as primarily informational and hence 
manageable through technical means that, again, involve 
minimal ethical oversight.445 
Further expressing concern over the need to revise 
regulation governing the use of biospecimens, Emanuel and 
Menikoff note that “[m]any commentators have argued that 
uncertainty about the regulations on biospecimens has 
impeded research. Yet research with biospecimens is becoming 
increasingly important;”446 they state this despite their 
assertion that “such research often entails no or minimal 
physical risk.”447 Having established a frame that juxtaposes 
excessive regulatory burden against minimal risk, they move 
on to make a case for the ANPRM’s suggestions that: 
[A] standard, brief, and general form be used to obtain consent for 
the future open-ended use of biospecimens in research. Further, 
such a form need not be signed each and every time a specimen is 
collected. Rather, researchers or hospitals might ask participants 
to sign one form in which they agree to such future use of all 
specimens (existing or to be collected in the future).448 
Significantly, these arguments appear under the heading 
“Enhancing Protections for Research Participants.”449 Such 
revisions, however, are clearly calibrated more to reduce the 
burden on researchers than to substantively enhance 
protections for research subjects. Hence Emanuel and Menikoff 
do not justify the proposal for open-ended consent by discussing 
the benefits it might provide to participants, but by asserting 
that such revisions will help to realize “the huge benefits to be 
gained from such research.”450 The Nuremberg Code, the 
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Helsinki Declaration, and the Belmont Report embraced 
consent as a foundational recognition of the agency and dignity 
of human subjects.451 While clearly still adhering to that view 
in cases of clinical research, Emanuel and Menikoff here cast 
consent, like risk, primarily as a burden to be managed in order 
to realize the research potential of biospecimens. 
In many respects, this view follows logically upon Emanuel 
et al.’s call for a duty to participate in human subjects research. 
Both are oriented toward promoting the basic conditions 
necessary to develop large-scale genetically-based population 
studies. The call of duty serves to bring people in the door; the 
exemption from IRB review facilitates the development and 
implementation of research protocols; and the relaxed consent 
process eases the final step of actually enrolling people in the 
study while opening up their data for free and unrestricted use 
in the future. 
Following the publication of the ANPRM, HHS collected 
comments from the public responding to its proposals.452 A 
majority of the more than eleven hundred comments received 
favored the provision allowing for a general consent form to 
permit future use of biospecimens and related data, clearly 
recognizing the burden this would lift from their research 
endeavors.453 Some comments, however, expressed grave 
reservations, particularly with respect to issues of consent.454 
The American Association of Medical Colleges (AAMC), for 
example, asserted that, 
An individual who is asked to sign a blanket consent document 
without any information about what type of research might be 
done in the future and with no opportunity to ask questions about 
the research that may be conducted (for example, if such consent is 
obtained just prior to surgery or on admission to a hospital) cannot 
be said to have provided meaningful informed consent. This could 
be more accurately characterized as “notice cloaked in consent’s 
clothing,” providing individuals with a false sense of individual 
control when, in fact, there is none.455 
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In contrast to viewing consent as a burden to be managed, the 
AAMC emphasized the role of consent as recognition of 
individual autonomy.456 It argued that completely open consent 
to all possible future use cannot be truly informed insofar as a 
subject cannot know to what purposes her biospecimens may 
ultimately be put.457 
Similarly, the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Human 
Research Protections (SACHRP) (created in 2001 and tasked 
with providing expert advice and recommendations to the 
Secretary of HSS on issues and topics pertaining to the 
protection of human research subjects)458 pushed back against 
some of the ANPRM’s suggestions regarding consent.459 It 
noted that the consent process had indeed become cumbersome, 
but attributed this less to the need to manage risk to subjects 
than to concerns “about minimizing the potential risk of 
adverse legal actions.”460 Here the SACHRP introduced a new 
type of risk into the review of the consent process. In contrast 
to the classic bioethical concerns to mitigate risk of personal 
harm, the SACHRP here recognized that risks of legal action 
introduced their own, distinctive burdens to the research 
process.461 A consent regime based on mitigating risks of 
personal harm to subjects may focus on issues of autonomy and 
informed consent in one way; but a consent regime shaped by 
concerns to mitigate risks of legal harm to researchers and 
their sponsors may give rise to very different sorts of 
approaches to consent. Certainly, the sort of brief, standardized 
open-consent form for biospecimens research proposed by the 
ANPRM was well tailored to mitigating legal risk. 
The SACHRP, however, expressed concern that the 
ANPRM focused “too much on the consent form as opposed to 
the consent process.”462 This concern comports well with the 
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findings of a group of researchers from the University of North 
Carolina who studied the attitudes of research subjects toward 
participating in a genomic biobank.463 In their 2010 paper, the 
researchers report that “whereas medical practice treats 
[consent] as an event, our subjects talk about it as a discursive 
process—that is, a process that unfolds over the course of 
multiple communicative interactions.”464 They found that while 
medical researchers focus on the actual act of signing a consent 
form, this means relatively little to subjects, who may give 
their consent for a wide range of reasons and may continue to 
be interested in ongoing issues of consent long after the basic 
form has been signed.465 
The SACHRP identified six core elements of a good consent 
process: “(1) statement that the project involves research; (2) 
purpose; (3) ‘voluntary statement’ (including withdrawal); (4) 
duration of participation; (5) risks related to the research itself; 
(6) potential benefits of the research to subjects and society.”466 
Under the Common Rule, consent is inextricably bound up with 
weighing risks and benefits; but as the SACHRP makes clear, 
risks are to be balanced against “potential” benefits.467 Each 
enables the other: risks must be managed to realize potential; 
potential must be substantial to outweigh risk. The balance is 
not a direct calculus; rather it is part of informing a subject and 
hence shaping her decision. One might well ask why potential 
benefit should be made part of the subject’s calculus at all. 
Making potential benefits a part of the consent process 
implicitly makes demands upon the subject, informing her not 
only of the dimensions of her altruism but also presenting a 
picture of what may be lost if she does not participate. 
The SACHRP went on to express concerns regarding the 
ANPRM’s proposed general open consent model for 
biospecimen research, stating that it 
believes that a general consent for future use should not be a 
necessary predicate for any and all future research uses, and that 
such a general consent cannot act as a substitute for careful 
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consideration by an IRB, through the existing waiver of consent 
process, of specific future research uses and their risks for 
subjects.468 
While perhaps placing unwarranted faith in the efficacy and 
rigor of IRB review, the SACHRP nonetheless understood that 
procedurally it was important to keep some formal mechanism 
or institution in the ongoing oversight of biomedical research—
even when risks were low and potential benefits high.469 It 
went on to observe that many industry-sponsored clinical trials 
already offered a form of tiered consent that presented an array 
of possible future uses to which participants could opt-in.470 It 
further noted that foregoing general open consent would not 
preclude future unanticipated uses of biospecimens “because, 
presently, researchers have the option of seeking from an IRB a 
waiver of informed consent for the future use.”471 The core of its 
objection to general consent, however, echoed the AAMC 
assertion about the inherent impossibility of providing truly 
informed general consent to all future uses.472 Participants, the 
Committee declared, 
cannot accurately and fully be apprised of future benefits, or of 
risks, or even of the research methods that might be employed, to 
an extent that would allow a researcher to “skip the step” in future 
specific studies of seeking either IRB waiver of consent, or subject 
re-consent, under the Common Rule.473 
Lest we consider the SACHRP as erecting excessive 
barriers to future research on biospecimens, it is important to 
realize that it was not advocating that control over such 
research be located directly with the research participants.474 
Rather, it argued for continuing under a regime that would 
allow experts on IRBs to make decisions about waiving consent 
for possible future uses.475 That is, it was arguing for keeping 
IRBs in the loop—not necessarily the participants 
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themselves.476 It makes this case clearly in raising the problem 
of free riding in a manner quite reminiscent of Emanuel et al.’s 
call for a duty to participate: 
It seems . . . contrary to the principles of beneficence and justice as 
put forth in the Belmont Report to advocate a state of affairs in 
which persons may refuse use of their own data and biospecimens, 
even when risk to them is negligible, but who nevertheless 
themselves benefit from such research by depending upon the 
beneficence of others. Further, one cannot then ensure that the 
results of any such research will be representative and not biased 
or skewed.477 
The SACHRP concluded that, counterintuitively, general 
consent might therefore actually impede the ability of 
investigators to use biospecimens for future research because of 
the ability of participants to opt out under general consent.478 
Moreover, it framed the ethical, legal and social policy 
implications of consent regimes as involving primarily tensions 
“between the needs of science and the rights of individuals.”479 
This characterization of the issue rather conveniently 
elides the role that commercial enterprises play in research and 
development based on biospecimens. This is particularly 
striking given the fact that the ANPRM itself mentioned the 
case of Henrietta Lacks, whose cells, taken without her 
knowledge or consent, provided the basis for billions of dollars’ 
worth of medical research and products.480 Moreover, the 
earlier GPPC town hall meetings had found widespread 
concern “that pharmaceutical or other companies might profit 
off of the taxpayer-funded proposed study.”481 One participant, 
for example, was worried that “[t]hey may produce drugs that 
are so expensive that most people couldn’t afford them.”482 For 
the SACHRP, however, such concerns did not play a part in 
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structuring the relationship between participant and 
researcher—that was cast solely in terms of realizing the 
potential of scientific progress—to which it cast individual 
rights as a barrier. To the extent commercial considerations 
entered the discussion, it was only in reference to having 
investigators make disclosures of their own financial interests 
in any research, not with reference to possible patenting of 
material or other commercial issues related to equity or 
distributional justice.483 
In December 2011, just months after the publication of the 
ANPRM, the Presidential Commission for the Study of 
Bioethical Issues issued a report titled, MORAL SCIENCE: 
Protecting Participants in Human Subjects Research.484 While 
the President’s charge to the Commission came largely in 
response to revelations by historian Susan Reverby concerning 
U.S. involvement in serious research abuses in Guatemala in 
the late 1940s (including the deliberate infection of vulnerable 
and uninformed subjects with venereal diseases),485 the 
Commission nonetheless was tasked to conduct “a thorough 
review of current regulations and international standards to 
assess whether they adequately protect human subjects in 
federally supported scientific studies.”486 The Bioethics 
Commission directly considered the ANPRM proposals to revise 
the IRB review and consent process.487 In contrast to the 
SACHRP, the Commission expressed few reservations.488 It 
formally endorsed numerous of the ANPRM’s proposals, 
including the elimination of “continuing review for certain 
lower-risk studies and regularly update the list of research 
categories that may undergo expedited review;” and providing 
“standardized consent form templates with clear language 
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understandable to subjects.”489 Significantly, apart from one 
passing reference in a footnote,490 the Commission’s 208 page 
report makes no mention at all of biospecimens or the 
ANPRM’s proposals regarding general consent for their future 
use. Rather, its approach to the ANPRM appeared to be shaped 
by a frame of regulatory oversight as a barrier to scientific 
progress, noting early on that “the Commission heard from a 
wide range of research professionals that the procedural 
requirements of human subjects regulations are often viewed 
as unwelcome bureaucratic obstacles to conducting 
research.”491 
The ANPRM thus serves as a complement to and logical 
extension of the GPPC town halls, GINA, and the call for a 
duty to participate in research, as they lay the foundations 
necessary to sustain and capitalize on the sort of large-scale 
longitudinal population studies called for by Francis Collins 
back in 2003.492 Each effort is fundamentally oriented toward 
overcoming perceived barriers to realizing the potential of 
biomedical research in a post-genomic age. First, you must find 
potential recruits and identify their interests and concerns. 
This was the job of the GPPC’s town halls and related 
surveys.493 Second, you need to give recruiters some tools to 
address those concerns. Here, GINA emerged as a formal legal 
structure that recruiters could invoke to address some of the 
primary concerns regarding privacy and discrimination.494 
Third, once you have addressed the negative barriers impeding 
possible recruitment, you need to develop a message to 
encourage potential recruits to take affirmative steps to enroll 
in biomedical research studies. Emanuel et al.’s call for a duty 
to participate asserted just such a positive claim upon 
individuals to enroll in research studies;495 the MVP served as 
a military adjunct to this call.496 Fourth, once you have recruits 
in the door, you have to minimize the burdens of consent and 
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regulatory oversight, particularly with respect to the type of 
information needed for the type of open-ended research central 
to large-scale population studies. The ANPRM directly 
addresses this issue, setting the stage for the development of 
massive new amounts of data that Collins hoped in 2003 would 
allow us to realize “the promise of genetic and environmental 
research for reducing disease burden on a population basis.”497 
IX. NCATS: FROM POPULATIONS TO CORPORATIONS 
Once you get people in through the door and obtain their 
consent, you ultimately need to use the information resulting 
from any study to create the promised therapies meant to 
actualize the potential of genomic medicine. Realizing Collins’s 
promises, in short, requires more than information and 
research. It demands that such research be translated into 
viable treatments—most prominently as new pharmaceuticals. 
Translational research is the concept of the moment at the 
NIH.498 It is framed by a widely held belief that some new 
initiative is needed to overcome the “valley of death” between 
basic science and applied interventions that obstructs the 
development of new molecular entities to treat disease.499 It is 
driven by a concern that drug company pipelines are drying up 
with no new blockbusters on the horizon.500 So powerful is this 
concept that it led to a structural reconfiguration of the NIH to 
create the National Center for Advancing Translational Science 
(NCATS) in 2011.501 
A central component of NCATS’s purpose is to conduct 
early stage research on molecular entities that show promise as 
potential treatments for disease but are deemed by private 
industry as too risky to invest in.502 This might also involve 
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rescuing drugs previously seen to be failures.503 An article in 
the New York Times analogized NCATS’s role “to that of a 
home seller who spruces up properties to attract buyers in a 
down market. In this case the center will do as much research 
as it needs to do so that it can attract drug company 
investment.”504 Collins later described the new Center’s 
mission as “catalyz[ing] the generation of innovative methods 
and technologies that will enhance the development, testing, 
and implementation of diagnostics and therapeutics across a 
wide range of diseases and conditions.”505 NCATS boosters 
frequently relate need for such a catalyst to data purporting to 
show the astronomical cost of bringing a new drug to market—
often in excess of $1 billion.506 
Strictly speaking, NCATS is not currently involved in 
directly exploiting the information derived from biobanks.507 Its 
creation, however, was driven by similar concerns to overcome 
barriers to realizing the potential of genomic medicine—most 
particularly the perceived bottleneck in drug development.508 
There is also a significant continuity in personnel between 
these earlier initiatives and NCATS—not only in Francis 
Collins, who now oversees all activities at the NIH, but more 
particularly in the person of Kathy Hudson. A prominent 
promoter of NCATS in 2011, Hudson had by then come to the 
NIH where she served as Francis Collins’s deputy director for 
science, outreach and policy.509 As director of the GPPC at 
Johns Hopkins, Hudson had been instrumental in developing 
the town halls and surveys that served as the foundation for 
both the NIH’s efforts to explore the feasibility of conducting a 
large population study and the Department of Veterans Affairs’ 
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development of the Million Veteran Program.510 By 2012, 
Hudson was taking on new duties as acting deputy director of 
NCATS.511 
NCATS also deals with common concerns regarding the 
proper allocation of risk in biomedical research—although it 
focuses more on questions of commercial risk than personal.512 
Logically building on these earlier initiatives, it constitutes a 
model for how best to handle the information produced through 
recruitment and research in order to create actual marketable 
biomedical products.513 In this regard, it provides a critical 
bookend to Emanuel et al.’s privatization of citizenship by 
similarly placing the public resources of the NIH’s 
infrastructure of publicly supported research at the disposal of 
private corporate entities—all in the name of serving the public 
good of improved health.514 
For fiscal year 2012, NCATS received $576,456,000 in 
funding, with the bulk going to support the ongoing Clinical 
and Translational Sciences Awards program, which supports a 
consortium of medical research institutions working to improve 
the way clinical and translational research is conducted 
nationwide.515 Other key NCATS initiatives include working 
with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the 
FDA to develop chips to mimic how humans respond to drugs 
so as better to predict drug safety and efficacy; working with 
industry to provide academic investigators and small 
businesses with the funding and information they need to 
investigate new uses for compounds from industry-provided 
drug collections; and working with the Environmental 
Protection Agency to screen environmental chemicals and 
drugs for toxicity.516 
Calls to create and fund NCATS consistently invoked the 
need to overcome bottlenecks in the drug development pipeline 
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by “de-risking” early stage research on potential drug 
compounds.517 Thus, for example, in 2012 testimony before 
Congress seeking appropriations for the coming year, NCATS’s 
first acting director Thomas Insel noted that “NCATS will focus 
on addressing scientific and technical challenges in order to 
reduce, remove, or bypass significant hurdles across the 
continuum of translational research;” and went on to assert 
that “[k]ey to the success of the NCATS mission is identifying, 
studying, and reducing significant bottlenecks in the process of 
translation.”518 In 2011, during the run up to creating NCATS, 
Francis Collins emphasized the need for public intervention to 
address “a downturn in the number of approved new molecular 
entities over the last few years,” noting that “drug development 
research remains very expensive and the failure rate is 
extremely high.”519 Collins here paired the bottleneck in the 
drug development pipeline with the idea that such activity is 
highly risky, causing pharmaceutical companies to cut back on 
research and development.520 “So we have this paradox,” 
Collins asserted, “we have a great opportunity to develop truly 
new therapeutic approaches, but are undergoing a real 
constriction of the pipeline.”521 One solution to the paradox, he 
concluded, was creating NCATS to help foster drug 
development.522 
In reaching this conclusion, Collins argued that “[w]e can’t 
count on the biotech community to step in and fill that void [in 
research and development] . . . because they are hurting from 
an absence of long-term venture capital support.”523 Elsewhere 
he stated that an 
array of new opportunities should portend a revolution in 
therapeutics discovery. . . . [However,] the potential utility of most 
of the newly discovered molecular targets will not be easy to 
validate. Even worse, the serious challenges that currently 
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confront the private sector may make it difficult to capitalize on 
these new opportunities.524 
For Collins, then, market failure in the pharmaceutical 
industry implicitly created the essential preconditions for 
NCATS.525 In 2011, Garret FitzGerald, McNeill Professor of 
Translational Medicine and Therapeutics at the University of 
Pennsylvania, echoed Collins’s attention to commercial 
problems as creating a space for NCATS when he noted that at 
a recent conference “industry representatives pointed out that 
drugs in development are often deprioritized for reasons other 
than toxicities, especially in this era of repeated mergers.”526 
He followed this identification of how non-scientific (“other 
than toxicities”) market forces (“mergers”) might be impeding 
research and development with a discussion of how NCATS 
would be able to “foster industry-academia interactions” by “de-
risking” approved compounds and pushing to expand a 
“precompetitive space” to foster translational medicine.527 
These schemes present the fundamental causes of the drug 
development bottleneck as economic, not scientific. This 
comports well with Collins’s ongoing promotion of the great 
potential of genomics to meet important human needs.528 A 
January 2011 article on NCATS in the New York Times noted 
that “Dr. Collins has been predicting for years that gene 
sequencing will lead to a vast array of new treatments, but 
years of effort and tens of billions of dollars in financing by 
drug makers in gene-related research has largely been a 
bust.”529 Collins responded by saying he was “frustrated to see 
how many of the discoveries that do look as though they have 
therapeutic implications are waiting for the pharmaceutical 
industry to follow through with them.”530 In his various 
comments, Collins thus located the failure to realize the early 
potential of the HGP with industry, not science.531 Moreover, 
he emphasized this same commercial failure so as to create the 
space for NCATS to intervene into provinces hitherto occupied 
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by industry—early stage drug development.532 Even in the face 
of a historical failure to realize the initial promise of the HGP, 
Collins still invoked the potential for science to develop new 
therapeutic interventions to drive the creation of NCATS.533 
Collins cast science as the realm of continued potential, 
demanding more support to be actualized, while he laid the 
unfulfilled promises of the HGP at the feet of market failure.534 
The failures Collins refers to characterize a space that has 
come to be known as the “valley of death” between research 
discoveries and medical treatments.535 NCATS’s advocates 
argue that it will provide a “bridge” over this valley by 
conducting early stage research that is too risky for private 
industry and developing candidate compounds to the point 
where a corporation might step in to license the compound and 
bring it forward for more advanced stage clinical trials.536 Dr. 
Jon Reed, CEO of the Sanford-Burnham Medical Research 
Institute in La Jolla, cast NCATS as “just the shot in the arm 
basic research needs to reach forward across that valley.”537 
The basic idea here is that risk-induced market failure has led 
to a bottleneck that has created a valley that needs to be 
bridged.538 There are really two distinct valleys that need to be 
bridged here.539 The first is one of translational science—
getting early stage research on potential drugs into late-stage 
clinical trials.540 The second is corporate—getting 
pharmaceutical companies interested in investing the funds 
necessary to take the drugs across that first bridge.541 
The corporate valley of death demands public investment 
and a socialization of economic risk to be bridged.542 This 
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layering of obstacles to be overcome sets the stage for allocating 
massive public resources (i.e., NCATS) to be put at the service 
of private enterprise (primarily pharmaceutical companies) in 
the name of serving the greater good (improved health).543 
Hence we have Collins responding to concerns about “whether 
it is appropriate for taxpayer dollars to facilitate the success of 
commercial enterprise,” by asserting that “medical advances 
that benefit the public generally arise from NIH-funded 
biomedical research only if actual products are developed and 
brought to market—and partnerships with the private sector 
are essential for this translation to succeed.”544 Or, as he put it 
in testifying before a Senate subcommittee on appropriations, 
“NCATS will benefit all stakeholders, including academia, 
biotechnology firms, pharmaceutical companies, the FDA, 
and—most importantly—patients and their families.”545 Collins 
thus presents NCATS as a win-win, non-zero sum investment 
that deserves, indeed demands, public investment because the 
ultimate beneficiary will be the public itself. His call to place 
the public resources of scientific research at the disposal of 
private enterprise provides an institutional counterpart to 
Emanuel et al.’s call to place the public resource of citizens’ 
bodies similarly at the disposal of private enterprise—all for the 
greater good. 
A. DELINEATING THE PRECOMPETITIVE SPACE 
Collins and Thomas Insel took great pains to emphasize 
that NCATS was not a government-sponsored drug company 
and that its activities would complement, not compete with, 
other drug development efforts.546 “As with sequencing of the 
human genome,” Collins asserted, “many of the most crucial 
challenges confronting translational science today are 
precompetitive ones.”547 The particular risks NCATS means to 
manage are those populating the precompetitive space where 
state intervention may ease the concerns of apprehensive 
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corporations wary of investing their own resources in uncertain 
endeavors.548 This space is one of commercial promise and 
therapeutic potential but also one of risk and danger.549 Here, 
the risks to be managed are primarily economic, as manifest in 
the high failure rate for candidate drug compounds and the 
great expense of drug development.550 These risks are cast as 
barriers to realizing the potential of drug development. The 
barrier, however, is not the failure rate; it is the reluctance of 
private capital to invest in early stage research. 
Collins characterized NCATS’s mission as to “identify 
opportunities for precompetitive innovation that are not 
currently being supported by academic or industry 
initiatives.”551 He went on to list such areas as including 
virtual drug design, preclinical toxicology, biomarkers, efficacy 
testing, phase zero clinical trials, rescuing and repurposing 
drugs, clinical trial design, and “postmarketing” research.552 A 
2010 Institute of Medicine (IOM) workshop on precompetitive 
collaboration identified key players in the space as including 
“academic and industry scientists, government entities, 
foundations, and patient advocacy groups, or the public at 
large;”553 certainly, a rather broad pool from which to draw. 
The resulting 2011 IOM report on the workshop, Establishing 
Precompetitive Collaborations to Stimulate Genomics-Driven 
Product Development, identified the precompetitive space as 
one where partnerships may “distribute the risks involved in 
research and development.”554 For Collins, many challenges to 
genomic progress are precompetitive.555 For the IOM, the 
precompetitive space is where relevant risks can be 
managed.556 Both views implicitly contrast the competitive 
                                                          
 548. Id. 
 549. Id. 
 550. Id. (detailing the “economic stresses and patent expirations” that 
plague pharmaceutical companies). 
 551. Id. at 3. 
 552. Id. 
 553. Jill S. Altshuler et al., Opening Up to Precompetitive Collaboration, 
SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED., Oct. 6, 2010, at 1. 
 554. STEVE OLSON & ADAM C. BERGER, ESTABLISHING PRECOMPETITIVE 
COLLABORATIONS TO STIMULATE GENOMICS-DRIVEN PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT: 
WORKSHOP SUMMARY 2 (2011), available at http://www.nap.edu/
catalog.php?record_id=13015. 
 555. Collins, supra note 5, at 2–3. 
 556. OLSON & BERGER, supra note 554, at 2. 
2014] PRIVATIZING BIOMEDICAL CITIZENSHIP 875 
 
arena of the market as one that increases risk or impedes 
productive risk management. 
Precisely what constitutes this precompetitive space, 
however, is contested and varies depending upon the party 
asked to define it. Those using the term generally imply it is 
somehow a safe space, a sort of commercial demilitarized zone 
where information may be shared without threat of losing some 
sort of edge in developing marketable products down the 
line.557 Nonetheless, participants at the IOM workshop 
recognized that “[a] major challenge is defining the domain of 
precompetitive research,”558 going on to note that the 
boundaries of precompetitive space may change over time and 
across domains, and concluding that “[t]he line may be drawn 
differently between academia, diagnostic companies, and 
pharmaceutical companies.”559 As Craig Lipset, head of clinical 
innovation within worldwide research and development at 
Pfizer, put it, “pre-competitive is in the eye of the beholder,” 
because “what is pre-competitive to one stakeholder is likely a 
key revenue source, business opportunity, or competitive 
differentiator to another stakeholder.”560 In an article co-
authored with Tania Bubela and E. Richard Gold, Garret 
FitzGerald added a temporal dimension to the precompetitive 
space, defining it as “the time during R&D in which there is 
collaboration but no competition.”561 Echoing Lipset, they went 
on to acknowledge that “the line between precompetitive and 
competitive research is in constant flux and has shown a 
tendency to move increasingly downstream toward clinical or 
therapeutic application up to and including proof of concept.”562 
They then consider how different actors, with different stakes, 
may have different conceptions of the precompetitive space.563 
Small biotechnology companies, for example, may have an 
interest in expanding competitive space upstream to basic 
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proofs of concept which may form the basis for patents that are 
central to their business models.564 Allowing such a free 
upstream extension of patent rights, however, may deter 
downstream innovation by larger companies and unnecessarily 
add to the overall cost of drug development.565 
What this often seems to come down to are legal questions 
of intellectual property (IP). Simply stated, a precompetitive 
space appears to be a space where patents cannot, or should 
not go.566 As Collins put it, the precompetitive space is one “in 
which intellectual property claims are expected to be 
limited.”567 A 2010 Wellcome Trust report on “Precompetitive 
Drug Boundaries” emphasized that “there needs to be more 
research conducted in an IP-free environment and more 
flexibility with existing IP by both academia and industry.”568 
Similarly, the 2011 IOM Report, asserted that, “numerous 
issues such as intellectual property (IP) protections and 
funding can be cumbersome or completely inhibitory to 
establishing collaborative ventures and must be overcome to 
facilitate this process and realize the potentially immense 
benefits.”569 Prominent among the key points raised by 
speakers at the IOM workshop was that “[e]stablishing IP-free 
zones would open new areas of R&D to precompetitive 
collaboration.”570 Here the IOM cast IP not only as obstructing 
collaboration, but as inhibiting the construction of a 
precompetitive space itself.571 
Bubela, FitzGerald, and Gold argue that when IP rights 
intrude into precompetitive space, where most discovery has 
little or no commercial value, they act as “a real drag on the 
innovation system” by keeping “competitively focused actors—
most often small biotechnology companies—alive despite the 
                                                          
 564. Id. at 4. 
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 566. OLSON & BERGER, supra note 554, at 49–50 (discussing IP-free zones 
as one potential solution to precompetition problems). 
 567. Collins, supra note 5, at 5. 
 568. WELLCOME TRUST, PRECOMPETITIVE DRUG BOUNDARIES: OPEN 
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inefficiencies of doing so.”572 In this scheme, precompetitive 
space is a place where IP may do more harm than good. It is 
therefore a normative space—a place where patents may be 
able to go, but should not go because of the bad effect they have 
on innovation. This bad effect is due not to the existence of 
patents per se, but to their premature introduction into the 
stream of invention.573 Ideally, patents are supposed to serve as 
an efficient spur to innovation, but in a precompetitive space 
patents are seen to inhibit efficiency.574 The boundaries of 
precompetitive space are thus here defined in part by inverting 
the logic of patent law: patents are supposed to increase 
efficiency; therefore they should not be allowed to go where 
they undermine efficiency.575 This is one way to define 
precompetitive space. 
In the context of promoting NCATS, IP thus emerges as a 
new and distinctive barrier to realizing the potential of genomic 
medicine. Previous barriers to realizing this potential primarily 
involved human subjects: overcoming resistance to 
participation by gauging the attitudes of potential recruits,576 
inculcating a sense of duty to participate,577 and reducing 
regulatory burdens of consent.578 In the realm of translational 
science, the barriers are legal and commercial.579 NCATS’s 
advocates characterize it as an instrument to create a space 
where such impediments cannot enter.580 In this hallowed 
space of translational research, public resources may also be 
“translated” into private profit by de-risking early stage 
research to the point where corporate enterprises might be 
interested in taking over the reins of further research and 
development.581 This point of hand-off presents yet another 
                                                          
 572. Bubela et al., supra note 561, at 3. 
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market to define the limits of the precompetitive space.582 It 
also defines the point at which corporate interests effectively 
privatize public resources—both monetary and intellectual—
first through IP rights and later through general commercial 
development and marketing.583 More than this, it also marks 
the point at which the Emanuel et al.’s call to service effectively 
completes the privatization of citizenship—turning over the 
benefits of public participation in clinical research and 
biobanking to private interests.584 
B. THE ALCHEMY OF PRECOMPETITIVE SPACE 
Though never explicitly discussed as such, the space 
occupied by human subjects recruitment and consent processes 
may also be characterized as precompetitive.585 Though 
marketing techniques surely have been central to the discipline 
of recruitmentology, recruiters themselves generally take great 
pains to contain the scope and reach of market forces in the 
process.586 This is especially true with respect to IP rights, the 
key to delimiting the precompetitive space.587 Thus, while on 
occasion potential subjects may receive a modicum of 
compensation for their participation, they are almost never 
given an interest in the products derived from the information 
contained in their bodies.588 
When it comes to NCATS, the notion of a precompetitive 
space provides an additional structuring metaphor to 
complement pipelines, bottlenecks, valleys, and bridges. 
Precompetitive space is presented as an arena where public 
and private, academia and industry, science and commerce can 
co-exist without conflict.589 It is an alchemical arena of 
translation—most explicitly where basic research is translated 
into usable therapies, but it is also an arena where public 
                                                          
 582. Id. 
 583. Id. 
 584. See supra notes 253–56 and accompanying text. 
 585. Collins, supra note 5, at 3 (discussing experimenting with clinical trial 
design). 
 586. Id. 
 587. Bubela et al., supra note 561, at 3 (“[T]he economic impact of patents 
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e.g., SKLOOT, supra note 480. 
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resources are translated into private profits and where private 
risk is socialized into a public burden.590 
Such concerns are prominent in a critique by Harvard 
Professors of Medicine and Public Health Jerry Avorn and 
Aaron Kesselheim of the assumptions underlying the creation 
of NCATS. In an article published in Nature Medicine titled 
The NIH Translational Research Center Might Trade Public 
Risk for Private Reward, they make clear their concerns that 
the model of de-risking research for industry places a double 
burden on taxpayers “who pay once for drug development and 
again for heavily marked-up products.”591 As they put it: 
“NCATS could require the public to absorb even more of the 
costs of risky basic biomedical research and then hand off the 
fruits of such investigation to manufacturers that have 
traditionally not been generous in sharing the profits from 
medications based on such discoveries.”592 
This amounts to a biomedical analogue of analyses of the 
2008 financial crisis; arguing that providing bailouts to major 
financial interests amounted to socializing the risks of 
corporate speculation, while allowing those same corporations 
to privatize the profits underwritten by such state support.593 
De-risking, then, is not simply a means of spurring upstream 
research into potential drug candidates; it is also a means of 
transferring resources from public to private hands.594 To a 
degree, the same can be said about the entire enterprise of 
recruiting participants for large-scale population studies. As 
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1176 (2011), available at http://www.nature.com/nm/journal/v17/n10/full/
nm1011-1176.html. 
 592. Id. 
 593. See, e.g., BAILOUTS: PUBLIC MONEY, PRIVATE PROFIT (Robert E. 
Wright ed., 2010); Nouriel Roubini, Is Purchasing $700 Billion of Toxic Assets 
the Best Way to Recapitalize the Financial System? No! It Is Rather a Disgrace 
and Rip-Off Benefitting Only the Shareholders and Unsecured Creditors of 
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there may be latent potential value in unexamined molecular 
entities, so too may there be latent value in the information 
contained in unexamined individual bodies. Like NCATS, the 
call for a duty to participate in research facilitates the 
appropriation and transfer of the value inhering in public 
resources (in the form both of human bodies and in the very 
concept of citizenship itself) into private (corporate) hands. This 
is the inverse of what political scientist Jacob Hacker has 
called the “great risk shift,” whereby an array of state 
sponsored social insurance programs—including health care—
have been progressively dismantled and privatized, shifting the 
risks of ill-health, unemployment, and retirement upon isolated 
individuals and families.595 Here, the state is creating new 
institutions, such as NCATS, to shift the risks of biomedical 
research from private corporations to the public. 
Avorn and Kesselheim also question some of the basic 
assumptions driving the creation of NCATS.596 They begin by 
noting that a disproportionate number of new products recently 
approved by the FDA (approximately two-thirds) are me-too 
drugs, members of an existing therapeutic class or else merely 
equivalent in efficacy to existing drugs already on the 
market.597 They argue that this reality undermines “the 
assumption underlying NCATS . . . that many potential drug 
targets or compounds have been identified but are not being 
adequately exploited.”598 If this were the case, then creating 
NCATS to “pursue leads that drug companies or investors have 
overlooked or have chosen not to invest in” would make 
sense.599 But, they ask: “Are there really many clinically 
promising compounds or targets that have been discovered but 
are languishing, neglected, in some laboratory—or that remain 
unexploited even though their properties are known?”600 
Beyond certain antibiotics, Avorn and Kesselheim are 
skeptical.601 
B.H. Munos of the InnoThink Center for Research in 
Biomedical Innovation and W.W. Chin of Harvard Medical 
                                                          
 595. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT, supra note 14, at 6. 
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School upend Collins’s discourse of risk by positing that drug 
companies need to take on more, not less risk, for the simple 
reason that reward correlates with risk.602 They argue that 
much of the current contraction in the drug pipeline has its 
roots in “the adoption of a new research model that swept the 
industry in the mid-1990s” that directed inordinate amounts of 
research and development resources toward finding 
blockbuster drugs.603 This model involved portfolio managers 
shunning risk in favor of pursuing a blockbuster drug 
development model that involved pursuing only “safe” 
incremental innovation.604 As a result, “[w]here bold vision 
once ruled, cautious analytics now prevail.”605 They actually 
find the drug pipeline to be “gushing,” but, like Avorn and 
Kesselheim, they find it producing marginal therapeutics that 
“struggle to rise above the standard of care or even placebo.”606 
These safe drugs actually may be crowding the pipeline and 
diverting resources from more innovative approaches to drug 
development.607 
To these critiques, Brandeis professor of biochemistry 
Gregory Petsko adds his belief that “the reason Collins is doing 
[NCATS] is that he is beset by people—in the U.S. Congress 
and from patient advocacy groups—who keep asking him, 
‘Where are all the cures you promised us?’”608 For Petsko, 
NCATS is not simply about addressing a bottleneck in the drug 
development pipeline, it is Collins’s latest attempt to maintain 
ongoing support for the successive promises made on behalf of 
genomic medicine going back two decades.609 Echoing Avorn 
and Kesselheim, Petsko goes on to argue that problems 
underlying the slow-down in new drug approvals lie not in the 
risks of early stage research but in the recent “merger mania” 
among major pharmaceutical companies that has “often 
resulted in bloated entities that are so busy managing the 
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problems caused by the merger that they have forgotten how to 
make drugs.”610 
These critiques raise the question of whether lack of 
innovation is a symptom or a cause of the high risk of new drug 
development and the bottleneck in the pipeline. The lack of 
innovation indicated by the focus on profit-proven me-too drugs 
(e.g., the fifth statin or the twentieth beta-blocker)611 may 
actually produce a higher level of risk for developing new 
therapeutics; this for the simple reason that the safe return on 
investment for a me-too drug makes the risks involved in 
pursuing a new, first-in-class drug appear relatively even 
greater. 
Francis Collins and other supporters of NCATS tell a fairly 
straightforward story of how it will help promote innovation 
and ultimately serve the public good: the need arises from an 
identified slow-down in new drug development that is assumed 
to be grounded in a reluctance to engage in risky early stage 
research given the high cost of bringing a new therapeutic 
compound to the market;612 NCATS can mobilize public 
resources to begin to analyze some of the literally thousands of 
untested molecular entities already stored in various public 
and private libraries and identify promising candidates for 
further development;613 when NCATS initiatives develop 
evidence that a particular candidate shows concrete promise of 
becoming an effective therapeutic, then a drug company can 
step in and invest the funds to conduct the large-scale clinical 
trials needed to bring the drug to the FDA for approval.614 
The critics tell a different story. For them, NCATS is part 
of a questionable attempt to address the wrong problem that is 
more likely to succeed in transferring massive public resources 
into private hands than it is to address any meaningful 
bottlenecks in new drug development.615 They see industry’s 
reluctance to engage in translational research as rooted in the 
                                                          
 610. Id. at 3. 
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search for the quick and easy profits of me-too drugs, 
augmented by constraints imposed by recent structural 
changes in the corporate organization of the pharmaceutical 
industry that further inhibit innovation.616 
Two recent studies, one concerning the productivity crisis 
in pharmaceutical research and development, the other 
examining preclinical cancer research, when viewed in relation 
to each other, raise additional questions about the logic 
underlying NCATS. The first article, authored by Fabio 
Pammolli, Laura Magazzini, and Massimo Riccaboni, argues 
that: 
[T]he decline in the productivity of pharmaceutical R&D cannot be 
fully explained by the forces of demand and competition, and we 
document an increasing focus of research activities in the 
development of selective drugs in complex research areas that are 
characterized by a low probability of success (POS). It seems that 
research efforts have been reoriented towards more difficult 
targets, while the number of options that can yield viable therapies 
has grown dramatically. Consequently, the cost of R&D of new 
drugs has risen.617 
In particular, the authors note that “the increase in the 
number of R&D projects targeting specific cancers is the main 
driver behind the reorienting of the R&D effort during the past 
decade.”618 Their analysis shows these projects had the lowest 
of possibility of success of the range of classes examined; hence 
the decline in productivity.619 The argument here is that the 
class of drugs being developed was centrally related to the 
rising rate of failure. 
The second article, by C. Glenn Begley and Lee M. Ellis, 
examined the failure to translate basic cancer research into 
viable new therapies, noting that “clinical trials in oncology 
have the highest failure rate compared with other therapeutic 
areas.”620 At first, this would seem to comport nicely with the 
work of Pammolli et al., noting the very low possibility of 
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success in cancer research and development.621 Begley and 
Ellis, however, went beyond the statistics of rate of success to 
look at the underlying studies that drove the clinical trials. 
They found that the failure rate was not related to the “high-
risk” nature of oncology research and development, but to the 
basic quality of the research itself.622 They discussed a study 
conducted by Amgen (in which Begley participated) that tried 
to confirm published findings relating to oncology in fifty-three 
studies published in “landmark” journals (papers in top 
journals, from reputable labs).623 Of the fifty-three papers, the 
Amgen study found only six (eleven percent) were replicated.624 
Begley and Ellis noted that “[i]n studies for which findings 
could be reproduced, authors had paid close attention to 
controls, reagents, investigator bias, and describing the 
complete data set. For results that could not be reproduced, 
however, data were not routinely analyzed by investigators 
blinded to the experimental versus control groups.”625 
Moreover, the article goes on to note that its findings are 
consistent with those of a separate study conducted by Bayer 
HealthCare in Germany that found only about twenty-five 
percent of published preclinical studies could be validated to 
the point at which projects could continue.626 “It was shocking,” 
Begley told Reuters: 
These are the studies the pharmaceutical industry relies on to 
identify new targets for drug development. But if you’re going to 
place a $1 million or $2 million or $5 million bet on an observation, 
you need to be sure it’s true. As we tried to reproduce these papers 
we became convinced you can’t take anything at face value.627 
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As the Nature editorial accompanying the article noted, “there 
are too many careless mistakes creeping into scientific 
papers—in our pages and elsewhere.”628 
When you connect the Begley and Ellis article to the one by 
Pammolli et al. you get a very different view of some possible 
reasons why the drug pipeline may be drying up. If, as 
Pammolli et al. show, pharmaceutical R&D is increasingly 
focused on developing cancer drugs and if, as the Amgen study 
shows, the overwhelming majority of studies driving the 
clinical trials underlying the development of new cancer drugs 
are flawed, then perhaps the “valley of death”629 NCATS is 
seeking to bridge has not been caused by a lack of translational 
research but by fundamental problems in the way the basic 
research itself is being conducted. If this is the case, then the 
rationale for establishing NCATS must be called into 
question—or at the very least, reexamined in light of these 
findings. 
Perhaps as significant as the findings of the Amgen study 
are what Begley and Ellis identify as possible causes of the 
problem. They note that the investigators studied “were all 
competent, well-meaning scientists who truly wanted to make 
advances in cancer research.”630 The problems they hypothesize 
were more structural and individual: 
To obtain funding, a job, promotion or tenure, researchers need a 
strong publication record, often including a first-authored high-
impact publication. Journal editors, reviewers and grant-review 
committees often look for a scientific finding that is simple, clear 
and complete—a ‘perfect’ story. It is therefore tempting for 
investigators to submit selected data sets for publication, or even to 
massage data to fit the underlying hypothesis.631 
Commenting on the Amgen study, Ken Kaitin, director of the 
Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, noted, “[i]f 
you can write it up and get it published you’re not even 
thinking of reproducibility . . . . You make an observation and 
move on. There is no incentive to find out it was 
wrong.”632 Indeed, all the incentives work in the other 
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direction—obtaining tenure, grant funding, or prestige all 
depends on high profile publications.633 
In recent years, as biomedicine has become an idealized 
golden goose for many major research universities, additional 
incentives may be driving the premature publication of results 
that directly relate academic standing to commercialization of 
research. Most obvious in this regard has been the broad rise in 
patent applications streaming from research universities and 
the concomitant rise of industry-academia collaborations.634 In 
an article in Science Translational Medicine, titled Why 
University-Industry Partnerships Matter, Anthony Boccanfuso 
lauds this development, noting that “some academic 
institutions have excelled at creating a supportive 
environment, and many more institutions are embracing this 
approach.”635 His model in this regard is Texas A&M, which 
“claims to be the first public university to officially consider 
technology commercialization in tenure and promotion 
decisions.”636 For “technology commercialization,”637 one might 
just as easily read “translational research.” Texas A&M, then, 
is engaged in precisely the type of effort NCATS aims to 
support. 
Pammolli et al. identified a trend toward R&D investments 
in the high-risk, low probability of success area of cancer 
drugs.638 Begley and Ellis identified shoddy cancer research 
that might be producing the low probability of success 
identified by Pammolli et al.639 Begley and Ellis further 
identified some systemic problems incentivizing the production 
of such research, central among these being tenure, grants, and 
prestige, not to mention editorial preferences for neat “stories” 
of successful research.640 Boccanfuso presents an additional 
incentive for publication at all costs by connecting 
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commercialization to tenure.641 While he praises this 
development, it may be feeding precisely into the dynamic 
driving the systemic problems identified by Begley and Ellis. 
NCATS embraces the translational approach of industry-
academia collaboration discussed by Boccanfuso. It is premised 
on an idea that such collaboration will produce the research 
breakthroughs needed to replenish the anemic drug pipeline.642 
But given the findings of the Amgen study, NCATS may be 
targeting the wrong problem. If Begley and Ellis are correct, 
then NCATS, particularly when viewed in relation to 
initiatives such as those pursued by Texas A&M, may be 
feeding into the unhealthy dynamic that incentivized the 
production of so much shoddy cancer research in the first place. 
An uncritical promotion of translational research thus has the 
potential to exacerbate the very problem it is seeking to 
address. 
For example, to the extent that research papers published 
in high profile journals (which themselves are often the 
subjects of patents) form a basis for technology 
commercialization, a dynamic of tenure review and potential 
profit provide a strong incentive for producing exactly the type 
of research that Begley and Ellis find to be so problematic.643 
Their critique shows up the false dream of trying to demarcate 
distinct and independent spheres of science and commerce in 
modern practice. 
While Collins and other boosters of unfettered biomedical 
potential may try to locate barriers to progress external to the 
scientific enterprise, (whether in corporate risk aversion, 
regulatory hurdles, or citizen reluctance to enroll in biobanks), 
in fact, these domains are inextricably interwoven, each shaping 
and creating the conditions under which they all develop. 
Commercial considerations of drug development, in particular, 
may be directly shaping how scientific questions are being 
framed, pursued, and disseminated644—not simply in the heavy 
handed direct examples of suppression of problematic research 
                                                          
 641. Boccanfuso, supra note 635, at 2. 
 642. See id. at 1. 
 643. See Begley & Ellis, supra note 620, at 533 (arguing that “[t]he 
academic system and peer-review process tolerates and perhaps even 
inadvertently encourages” publishing “erroneous, selective or irreproducible 
data”). 
 644. Id. 
888 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 15:2 
 
results documented in such notorious cases as Vioxx645—but in 
day-to-day scientific practice or the sort examined by Begley 
and Ellis.646 More money, “de-risking” research, or creating a 
“precompetitive space” will not suffice to address this issue. An 
understanding of the interconnectedness of these domains and 
practices is essential to realizing the type of progress Collins 
and others envision for our collective biomedical future. 
X. CONCLUSION: CUI BONO? RISK, DUTY, AND 
POTENTIAL IN THE CIRCLE OF PHARMACEUTICAL LIFE 
Francis Collins’s interest in following up the HGP with a 
large-scale population study and his promotion of NCATS 
bookend this story. Throughout, Collins cast the major barriers 
to realizing the potential of genomic medicine as exterior to the 
scientific enterprise itself, residing in the domains of society, 
law, and the market.647 As the sequencing of the first human 
genome did not in itself bring us to the promised land of 
genomic medicine, Collins and others identified bodies as the 
primary barrier to proceeding down this road of potential.648 
Science needed massive numbers of bodies enrolled in LPSs to 
get the information necessary to achieve genomic 
breakthroughs.649 The barriers to recruitment were cast as 
social and legal. Prominent among social barriers were 
ignorance, fear, and inertia;650 among legal barriers were 
regulatory oversight and informed consent.651 
The GPPC town halls and surveys were designed to figure 
out ways to address popular ignorance and fear. Ignorance was 
to be addressed through education and outreach. Whatever 
fears were not addressed by education, GINA would resolve by 
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assuring potential recruits that their genetic information could 
not be used to discriminate against them.652 Emanuel et al.’s 
call for a duty to participate aimed to overcome citizen inertia, 
providing a normative, if not formally legal, incentive to get 
new recruits in the door.653 Revisions to the Common Rule were 
to serve, in part, to lessen and regularize the regulatory 
burdens of consenting recruits and providing ongoing oversight 
of the information derived from their participation.654 
Once researchers had bodies to work on, promoters of 
NCATS located the barriers to fulfilling genomic potential in 
the realm of law and the market. Creating a precompetitive 
space where government and academic scientists could de-risk 
early stage research would compensate for market failures of 
the pharmaceutical industry that had created bottlenecks in 
the drug development pipeline.655 In the enterprise of 
translational science, patents themselves could act as barriers 
to realizing potential if they were not kept in their proper 
place.656 Central to the idea of the precompetititve space was 
delimiting an area where IP rights could or should not attach 
to innovation.657 
NCATS is merely the most recent federally sponsored 
initiative intended to realize the full potential of genomic 
medicine. From the Human Genome Project itself, to the 
NIH/GPPC town halls, GINA, Emanuel et al.’s call for a duty to 
participate, the MVP, and revisions to the Common Rule, 
diverse federal actors centering primarily around the NIH have 
been making demands upon public resources—bodily, civic, 
intellectual, and monetary—in the name of serving a common 
good of better public health and well-being. Diverse critiques of 
NCATS and the broader privatization of science call upon us to 
recontextualize these initiatives, particularly as those 
promoting them have tended to elide the way in which they 
appropriate these myriad resources into the hands of private 
corporate interests. This appropriation may be accomplished 
fairly directly, as in NCATS’s move to de-risk early stage 
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research for drug companies.658 But it has also been 
accomplished more subtly through a manipulation of the very 
concepts of risk, duty, and barriers to realizing potential 
underlying these diverse initiatives. There are, in short, two 
pipelines driving these initiatives: one is the explicitly defined 
pipeline for innovative therapeutics to improve health; the other 
is a tacit pipeline to privatize public resources (including 
citizenship itself) and to socialize risk for corporate interests. 
A. ASYMMETRIES OF RISK 
Tropes of risk run throughout this story, carrying different 
valences and implications depending on where they appear. 
Broadly speaking the story identifies three areas of risk on the 
road to realizing the potential of genomic medicine: 
Individual—harm to research subjects; Legal—primarily in the 
form of potential liability for harm to research subjects, but 
also as regulatory burdens and obstructive IP rights; and 
Commercial—as market failure and loss of return on 
investment. Significantly, these risks are generally cast as 
external to the scientific enterprise.659 Except for the external 
critics of the NCATS model, there is very little discussion of 
any risks that might inhere within scientific practice itself. 
Rather, promoters of these diverse federal initiatives 
consistently locate the risks of failure in the purportedly 
distinct realms of society, law, and commerce. In doing so, they 
also mask the way risk-talk mediates between knowledge and 
power, in particular the ways in which even the most 
technologically framed assessments of risk in regulatory 
contexts invariably implicate value judgments about such 
matters as what counts as risk, how and by whom it is to be 
assessed, and by reference to what values its significance is to 
be gauged.660 
Framing and addressing risk plays a central role in the 
recruitment of subjects to biobanks and other large-scale 
population studies. Recruiters articulate risk in recruitment in 
two distinct but overlapping registers. The first is exemplified 
by Francis Collins’s initial call in 2003 for the development of 
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LPSs without which the genomic enterprise may be 
jeopardized.661 At a 2011 IOM workshop on “Public 
Engagement and Clinical Trials,” Dr. Jeffrey Drazen, Editor-in-
Chief of the New England Journal of Medicine, articulated this 
first concern in relation to a second type of risk to research 
subjects themselves, stating “that unless we can persuade more 
people to put themselves at risk, the rate at which we will be 
gathering knowledge will become smaller and smaller.”662 He 
acknowledges that “[p]rogress requires a population willing to 
put itself at risk,”663 but implies that a failure of citizens to take 
such risks upon themselves itself constitutes a risk to 
biomedical progress that the IOM must address through such 
measures as public engagement.664 The only way to reduce the 
risk to medical progress posed by low recruitment is to convince 
potential subjects to take a different type of risk upon 
themselves. This is not quite a risk shift, in that there are two 
distinct types of risks at issue here. It does illustrate, however, 
how different risks may be interrelated and made dependent 
upon one another. 
In the realm of genomic research, Collins and others cast 
the primary risks to potential recruits as informational rather 
than bodily (as might be the case in, for example, 
pharmaceutical clinical trials).665 The ANPRM for the Common 
Rule states that, “[s]ince there would be new mandatory 
standards for data security and information protection to 
address informational risks, only non-informational risks 
would be considered in determining the level of risk posed by 
research studies.”666 This presents informational risk as 
primarily a technical problem susceptible of management by 
improved data security standards. GINA similarly involves 
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managing informational risk.667 Its advocates presented it as a 
means to address the fears of potential recruits.668 But many of 
these same advocates viewed those fears as minimal or 
irrational. For them, GINA’s real purpose was less to manage 
information risks per se than, by so doing, to manage the 
underlying risk that a failure of recruitment would pose to 
medical progress.669 This stands in stark contrast to how 
promoters of NCATS (often the same people) tend to treat 
corporate wariness of risky investment in early stage research 
as rational economic behavior that needs to be accommodated 
by providing public support for translational research. 
Where GINA and related efforts at recruitment invoked 
risk in framing their aims and purpose, the Common Rule more 
directly engages the parameters of acceptable risk in human 
subjects research. The fundamental role of the IRBs 
established pursuant to the Common Rule is “to ensure that 
the risks have been minimized to the extent reasonably 
possible and that any remaining risks are justified by the 
benefits the study is likely to achieve.”670 This befits the Rule’s 
emergence from the tradition that gave rise to both the 
Nuremberg Code and the Helsinki Declaration. Yet, the 
dominant theme of GINA and NCATS is “de-risking” aspects of 
research to promote participation and development. This 
imperative presents a possible challenge to the Common Rule. 
While the purpose of the Common Rule is to minimize risk 
to human subjects, discussions of the need to revise it were 
informed by references to legal, regulatory, and commercial 
risk.671 The ANPRM itself was framed by references to key 
concerns that the burdens of regulatory oversight were “not 
adequately calibrating the review process to the risk of 
research” and general “inefficiencies” in the process that 
inhibited both research and subsequent product 
development.672 In commenting on the ANPRM to revise the 
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Common Rule, the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Human 
Research Protections attributed the long and legalistic nature 
of current standard consent forms to concerns “about 
minimizing the potential risk of adverse legal actions” and 
“regulatory oversight.”673 Managing these diverse types of risk 
can create tensions between the interests of the parties they 
threaten: research subjects, researchers, and institutions. 
NCATS, of course, is suffused with the language of risk 
management. It exists to de-risk early stage research. Looking 
at the nature of the process more closely, however, we see that 
NCATS does not actually aim to make the scientific endeavor of 
research itself any less risky. That is, the development of 
cooperative endeavors in the precompetitive space does not aim 
to change how scientists proceed with the work of discovery, 
merely the external conditions under which discovery occurs. 
The risks NCATS seeks to manage are the legal and 
commercial risk that may be driving pharmaceutical 
corporations away from basic research.674 Creating a 
precompetititve space is meant to reduce the threat posed by IP 
rights to the free flow of ideas among potential collaborators—
patents can be risky things; and de-risking itself focuses on 
shifting the risk of commercial failure from private to public 
institutions. Such commercial risk, of course, is bound up with 
the risk of scientific failure, but it is not the same thing. The 
NCATS model does not manage the risk of scientific failure; it 
manages the commercial risk such failure poses to 
pharmaceutical companies. It is premised on drawing a clear 
line between commercial and scientific risk as operating 
independently of one another. This stands in stark contrast to 
the critiques by the likes of Munos and Chin who argue that 
risk aversion within scientific practice itself is a problem;675 or 
the evidence brought to light by Begley and Pammolli 
challenging as problematic research strategies that focus on 
drug development in the class of cancer drugs, which have a 
high risk of failure;676 or finally, the implication that 
commercial risk itself is shaping the way scientific risks are 
being conceptualized, framed, and addressed. Keeping science 
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separate from law and commerce, however, allows advocates to 
more effectively make demands upon citizens and the state to 
realize its latent potential. 
This regime of biomedical progress constructed a basic 
asymmetry in assignment of risks between individuals and 
corporations—just as there is with duties imposed. Great pains 
are taken to reduce or eliminate risks for corporations as a way 
of bringing them to the table of drug development. Risks to 
individuals, however, are managed by being cast largely as a 
technical function of information management. The work 
involved in creating a large-scale population study actually 
produces risks for individuals. To be sure, legal regimes such as 
GINA are intended to manage these new risks but the ANPRM 
also proposes ways for those risks, in effect, to exist for 
indeterminate amounts of time as research on biospecimens 
may be conducted into the indefinite future.677 
B. DUTIES WITHOUT RIGHTS 
Citizen duties bracket the biomedical enterprise. At the 
front end, we have Emanuel et al.’s call for an obligation to 
participate in research in order to realize the potential of 
genomic medicine.678 This participation provides the basis for 
developing new biomedical products and services. At the back 
end we have Rose and Novas’s idea of a biological citizen with a 
duty to act as an informed consumer of these products and 
services.679 Heath, Rapp, and Taussig’s idea of genetic 
citizenship provides an alternative model of a more engaged 
and less atomized citizen, bound together by common concerns 
to make demands on government and industry.680 This model, 
however, appears limited to more interest group-like, condition-
specific activism, much like Epstein’s notion of biopolitical 
citizenship.681 The duties of the biological citizen as consumer 
embrace us all, along the lines of Childerhose’s more coercive 
conception of genomic citizenship, where we are all deemed 
ultimately creatures of our genes with concomitant obligations 
to put our genetic information at the service of the public 
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good.682 We enter this cycle of pharmaceutical life with a duty 
to be consumed—to put our bodies at the disposal of biomedical 
research. We complete the cycle with a duty to consume the 
resulting products and services—thereby exercising proper care 
of ourselves. These duties effectively privatize citizenship, 
recasting service to the political community as a function of 
service to the corporate enterprise of biomedical research, 
development, and marketing. 
Yet, unlike the traditional models of civic duty, there are 
no corresponding rights paired with these duties. In the 
conceptualization of biobanks, the GPPC and others simply did 
not entertain the idea that recruits might have an affirmative 
right of access to the data derived from their participation (as, 
for example, they have in the Estonian biobank referenced in 
the GPPC promotional materials).683 At most, they conceived of 
subjects’ rights as market-based goods to be bargained over as 
an incentive to recruitment. Similarly, in their call for a duty to 
participate in biomedical research, Emanuel et al. never 
posited a concomitant right of access to health care, nor has 
there been any articulation of a right of access on reasonable 
terms to the products developed by private corporations 
through the public support from NCATS. 
Emanuel et al. invoked risk and potential in framing their 
call for an obligation to participate in medical research—the 
risk that failure to participate may jeopardize the ability to 
biomedicine to reach its full potential to serve the public 
good.684 They argued that the fact that most of this research 
would be carried out by private corporations for private profit is 
not a problem because it all ultimately redounds to the public 
good in the form of improved health.685 When considered in 
relation to the proposed revisions to the Common Rule and the 
creation of NCATS, the concept of a civic duty to help realize 
the potential of biomedical research becomes even more 
problematic. In the end, all these diverse initiatives serve 
primarily to appropriate and transfer public value into private 
hands. In this model, the public good of health exists only as 
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mediated through a market nexus controlled by private 
corporations. In the name of actualizing the latent potential of 
biomedical research, it imposes duties without rights and 
distributes risks asymmetrically and always to the benefit of 
corporate interests. 
From biobanks to NCATS, powerful voices in the federal 
government and allied private entities are asking us to place a 
vast array of public resources, most notably our bodies, but also 
our shared public investment in biomedical research and 
development, in the service of private enterprise, all in the 
name of realizing the potential of genomic medicine. This 
potential may be real. Certainly, significant advances have 
been made over the past few decades. But the repeated 
promises made on behalf of achieving a biomedical millennium, 
where the blind shall see and the lame shall walk, also serve a 
political purpose of framing priorities and allocating resources 
in a manner that itself has the “potential,” if you will, to 
transform long-held public understandings of civic commitment 
and community into privatized notions of citizenship that call 
upon us to place ourselves literally at the disposal of corporate 
interests. 
 
